BIG BANKS AND BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS
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The banking industry and the patent system are longstanding
American institutions whose histories date back to the founding of this
country. Historically, however, the paths of these two institutions rarely
crossed. Although financial firms have been increasing their innovative
output for decades now, until recently they relied on trade secrecy, first
mover advantages, and other business mechanisms to protect and monetize
their intellectual property – not patents.
Through a convergence of circumstances over the past several years,
that pattern has changed. The shift began when the Federal Circuit decided
that business methods—banks’ primary mode of innovation—are
patentable subject matter. That decision triggered an increase in the
number of business method patents issued by the PTO, and,
correspondingly, a surge in patent infringement litigation targeting big
banks. When the banks found little success in court, their powerful lobby
persuaded Congress to include a special carve out for financial patents in
the America Invents Act—the comprehensive patent reform legislation
enacted in 2011. Meanwhile, as the financial industry sought legislative
favor to ward off future infringement suits, many of the big banks built
substantial patent portfolios of their own.
This Article explores this nascent relationship and considers some
potential implications of growing bank involvement in our patent system.
It suggests that the intersection of these institutions could yield some
benefit, for example by improving the publicly available information
regarding financial innovations. Yet, more pointedly, it warns of possible
harms, especially if big banks use their political and economic power to
disproportionately influence patent reform and innovation policy in the
future.

* Associate Professor, Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
** Professor, Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. Earlier versions of
this Article were presented at workshops and conferences at the George Washington
University Law School, American University Law School, and the Wharton School. We
thank the participants at those events, as well as Stefania Fusco and Saule Omarova, for
their insightful feedback. Many thanks to Arturo Chang and Daniel Kane, who provided us
with essential research assistance.

431

432

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 16:2

INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................432
I.CHARACTERISTICS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION .....................................436
A. Defining Financial Innovation .................................................436
B. Why Innovate?.........................................................................437
C. Benefits and Costs of Financial Innovation .............................438
II.PATENTABILITY OF FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS ......................................440
A. Protecting Financial Innovation...............................................441
B. State Street and the Patentability of Business Methods...........442
C. Reactions to the State Street Decision .....................................446
III.BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS FROM STATE STREET TO BILSKI ..............448
A. The Rise of Business Method Patents .....................................448
B. Business Method Patent Litigation ..........................................450
C. High Tech Business Method Patent Litigation ........................451
D. Financial Business Method Patent Litigation ..........................453
E. Bilski........................................................................................455
IV.BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS AND THE AIA ........................................459
A. The Banks’ Role in Patent Reform ..........................................460
B. Section 18 of the AIA and Covered Business Method
Patents......................................................................................462
C. Post-AIA Reactions to Section 18 ...........................................464
V.THE PATENT PORTFOLIOS OF BIG BANKS..............................................469
A. Patent Activity of Big Banks ....................................................470
B. Character of Big Bank Patents ..................................................474
C. Why Are Big Banks Patenting? ................................................477
VI.IMPLICATIONS OF BANK PARTICIPATION IN THE PATENT SYSTEM ......479
A. The Banks as Patent Reformers ...............................................479
B. The Banks as Patent Owners ...................................................482
1. Litigation Implications.......................................................482
2. Regulatory Implications.....................................................485
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................487
APPENDIX...................................................................................................488
INTRODUCTION
In 2012, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)
issued 165 patents to Bank of America, the second largest U.S. bank. Less
than a decade earlier, Bank of America’s patent holdings were barely worth
counting.1 While Bank of America was busy becoming a significant patent
owner, Congress overhauled the U.S. patent system by passing the most
1. See infra Part V (discussing the patent holdings of Bank of America and other U.S.
banks).
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comprehensive legislative reform since 1952.2 Twenty years ago, the
patent system and big banks had little to do with each other. Today, their
landscapes are merging through the confluence of various developments
relevant to innovation in general and financial innovation in particular.
The foundations of our patent system and the support of innovation
run deep. The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to grant patents to
inventors to “promote the progress of science and useful arts.”3 The patent
system is designed, therefore, “to foster, not foreclose, innovation.”4 Few
would dispute that a patent system is capable of promoting innovation,5 but
substantial controversy persists over whether our system actually does.
While patents provide an incentive to innovate by granting the inventor a
limited monopoly, the benefits of innovation can be outweighed by the
rent-seeking of the monopolist. The trick is finding the right balance, and
for some time now the sentiment has been that the U.S. system needs
recalibration.6
It seemed that the explosive growth in patent litigation in the early
2000s, particularly in the high technology sector, could serve as sufficient
incentive for reform. Indeed, high tech giants like Microsoft and Google
led the call for Congress to revamp our patent system. 7 Yet it has always
been difficult to pass legislation in the absence of a major crisis. Perhaps
the wake of the Great Recession and accompanying urgent need for jobs
provided the perfect opportunity for Congress to pass patent reform
legislation. In signing the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011
(“AIA”),8 President Obama heralded the new law as a means of stimulating
economic growth.9 Substantively, the new law is best known for moving
2. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284-341 (2011)
(codified as amended in scattered parts of 35 U.S.C.).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
4. CLS Bank Intern. v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F. 3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
5. For a skeptical view of patent systems, see Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine,
The Case Against Patents (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper 2012-035A,
2012) (arguing that there’s no empirical evidence showing that patents increase innovation
and productivity).
6. See Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution (NBER
Working Paper No. 1314, 2007) (“While there is no doubt that the U.S. economy remains
highly innovative, and there is no doubt that the patent system taken as a whole plays an
important role in spurring innovation, the general consensus is that the U.S. patent system is
out of balance and can be substantially improved.”) (emphasis added).
7. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Microsoft, Oracle Call for Patent Reform, CNET (Apr.
25, 2005) http://news.cnet.com/Microsoft,-Oracle-call-for-patent-reform/2100-1030_35683240.html.
8. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284-341 (2011)
(codified as amended in scattered parts of 35 U.S.C.).
9. Press Release, President Obama Signs America Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent
System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New Steps to Help Entrepreneurs
Create Jobs, Office of Press Secretary, The White House (SEPTEMBER 16, 2011).

434

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 16:2

the U.S. from a “first-to-invent” to a “first-to-file” regime for patent
protection. However, the AIA affects many other reforms that will have
significant implications for how patents are obtained and enforced in this
country.
Alongside these major developments in the patent realm came
important changes for the financial services industry. For a long time, the
conventional wisdom was that financial institutions were uninterested in
patents and the litigation surrounding patents. Instead, banks relied on
other means of protecting their innovations, such as trade secret rights and
first mover advantages.10 But a convergence of events over the past decade
or so challenged this conventional wisdom, and now patents undoubtedly
matter to the financial industry.
To begin, the financial services industry has been engaged in a period
of high profile innovation in products, processes, and organizations. In
fact, some of those innovations have been identified as contributing to the
Financial Crisis of 2008.11 As firms increased innovative output, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”)—the court
with exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals—opened the door for
patenting of business methods, the types of inventions most relevant to the
financial industry.12 Although big banks did not patent their inventions
right away, others did—namely, individual inventors and small entities—
and then they started suing the banks for patent infringement.13
At that point, many financial institutions began seeking patent
protection for inventions in unprecedented numbers, most likely to ward off
future infringement suits.14 But defensive patenting was insufficient, and
patent owners continued to target the financial industry with infringement
suits. So the big banks turned to Congress and used their unparalleled
political power to gain favorable treatment in the AIA. Specifically, the
bank lobby persuaded Congress to create a unique post-grant administrative
review procedure that allows financial patents to be challenged at the PTO,
rather than in expensive, prolonged litigation in federal court.15

10. See infra Part II.A (discussing how the financial industry has traditionally protected
innovation).
11. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED
STATES (2011) (explaining how some financial innovations may have been a contributing
factor to the Financial Crisis of 2008).
12. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (involving a patent for a data processing system used for financial services).
13. See infra Part III (considering recent patent litigation activity against the financial
industry).
14. See infra Part V (detailing the big banks’ expanding patent portfolios).
15. See infra Part IV (discussing the bank lobby’s role and agenda in the passage of the
AIA).
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That big banks, unlike high tech companies, were able to secure this
“bailout” under the AIA speaks volumes about the influence of these
institutions.16 In a relatively short time span, financial institutions have
immersed themselves in the patent world – both as patent owners and
advocates for reform. And while the banks’ involvement in the patent
system may have initially appeared aberrational or fleeting, their
participation in the most recent round of reform efforts proves that theory
wrong.17 To the contrary, the banks have found a place at the table in the
patent debate—a topic that merits attention not only because of the banks’
political power, but because of their importance to the economy more
generally. This Article seeks to shed light on this emerging relationship
between the financial industry and the patent system.
This Article proceeds in six parts. Part I overviews the characteristics
of financial innovation, exploring briefly what motivates inventors and
weighing the social costs and benefits of financial innovation. Part II
discusses the patentability of financial innovations, focusing on the Federal
Circuit’s decision in State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., in
which the court held that business methods are patentable subject matter
under § 101 of the Patent Act.18 This Part explains the State Street court’s
rationale and considers some early reactions to this controversial decision.
Part III traces the rapid rise of business method patents—and litigation
surrounding those patents—in the wake of State Street. Specifically, it
canvasses litigation directed at the high tech and financial sectors, and
addresses how this litigation explosion spurred a call for patent reform.
Part IV then introduces the AIA and discusses the big banks’ role in this
legislative reform effort. This Part gives particular attention to section 18
of the AIA, pursuant to which Congress established a special post-grant
review proceeding exclusively for financial business method patents.19 It
also highlights some of the most recent patent reform proposals currently
pending before Congress.
Part V turns from the banks’ patent reform activity to their patent
acquisition activity and examines the current patent holdings of certain
large financial institutions. This Part looks not only at the quantity of
patents that big banks are amassing, but also considers the nature of the
inventions being patented and the possible reasons why some banks have
started patenting in substantially greater numbers.
Finally, Part VI of the Article considers the implications of big banks’
16. Paul Michel, Rein in the Big Bank Bail-Out, PATENTLY-O (July 7, 2011),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/07/guest-post-rein-in-the-big-bank-bail-out.html.
17. See infra Part IV.C (addressing the most recent set of patent reform proposals).
18. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
19. See infra Part IV (describing the recently created administrative review process for
financial business method patents).
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participation in our patent system. We argue that big banks have already
exercised their political power to influence lawmakers once, and expect
that they will continue to do so in the future.20 Given what little experience
banks have in the patent arena, and the fundamental differences between
financial and technological innovation, the banks’ considerable influence
on innovation policy is cause for concern. Moreover, potential litigation
and regulatory implications associated with the banks’ expanding patent
portfolios suggest that banks should proceed with caution into the
unchartered territory of financial patents.
I.

CHARACTERISTICS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION

A. Defining Financial Innovation
Dictionary definitions of “innovation” focus on something that is
“new or different.” Yet, equating innovation with novelty seems overly
neutral, failing to capture the positive spin that seems associated with
“innovation.” In Webster’s unabridged dictionary, the first definition is the
“introduction of something new” followed by this illustration: “as the
driving force in practical economic advance.”21 The illustration of the
definition seems to better capture the implication often associated with
innovation. In other words, innovation is not simply something new but is
progressive.
“Financial innovation” carries its own particular meaning. Tufano’s
definition focuses on newness and widespread adoption: “Broadly
speaking, financial innovation is the act of creating and then popularizing
new financial instruments as well as new financial technologies,
institutions and markets.”22 In their survey of empirical studies on financial
innovation, Frame and White define it as “something new that reduces
costs, reduces risks, or provides an improved product/service/instrument
that better satisfies participants’ demands.”23 We prefer the second
definition because it better captures the positive/aspirational nature of
innovation.
20. See infra Part VI (discussing the role of big banks in the patent reform debate).
21. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 1166 (1986) (defining innovation as “1: the act or an instance of innovating:
the introduction of something new (~ as the driving force in practical economic advance—
Times Lit. Supp.) 2: something that deviates from established doctrine or practice . . .
CHANGE, NOVELTY . . . .”).
22. Peter Tufano, Financial Innovation, THE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF
FINANCE 4 (Stulz, Lerner, Villalongo, eds., 2002).
23. W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation:
Lots of Talk, Little Action? 3 (2002), available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/researchand-data/events/2002/financial-services-and-payments/papers/frame_white.pdf.
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Financial innovation can be categorized into groups: new products or
services (e.g., structured investments), new processes/procedures (e.g., risk
management systems), and new organizations (e.g., internet banking).24
While such groupings may be useful in some contexts, innovations can also
fall into more than one grouping or simply defy categorization. Because of
the limitations associated with grouping financial innovations by type, they
are also sometimes identified by function (e.g., managing risk; price
discovery; etc.).25
B. Why Innovate?
Firms innovate for many reasons. Financial institutions may be
motivated to innovate to respond to macroeconomic conditions such as
inflation, interest and exchange rates. Innovation can breed more
innovation as growth in new technologies spurs other advances. Moreover,
the avoidance of tax and regulatory constraints are among the motivations
cited prominently.26
Yet, the primary motivators for financial innovation are customer
demand and firm profits. In Stefania Fusco’s study of patents on financial
methods, survey respondents reported that the main incentive for
innovation “was the need to satisfy clients’ demand and generate profits.”27
24. See id.. For further discussion of different types of innovation, see OECD’s OSLO
MANUAL: GUIDELINES FOR COLLECTING AND INTERPRETING INNOVATION DATA 27 (3d ed.
2005)..
25. Merton and Bodie identified six core functions of the financial system:
To provide ways of clearing and settling payments to facilitate trade. To
provide a mechanism for the pooling of resources and for the subdividing of
shares in various enterprises. To provide ways to transfer economic resources
through time, across borders, and among industries. To provide ways of
managing risk. To provide price information to help coordinated decentralized
decision-making in various sectors of the economy. To provide ways of dealing
with the incentive problems created when one party to a transaction has
information that the other party does not or when one party acts as agent for
another.
Robert C. Merton and Zvi Bodie, A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing the Financial
System 2 (1995) available at
http://www.nek.lu.se/NEKENO/Finance%20B/A%20Framework%20for%20Analyzing%20
the%20Financial%20System.pdf. The Bank of International Settlements adopted a
functional approach. Bank of International Settlements, Recent Innovations in International
Banking (1986), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ecsc01a.pdf; see also Tufano, supra
note 22, at 8.
26. For further discussion of conditions that urge financial innovation, see Dionisis Th.
Philippas & Costas Siriopoulos, Is the Progress of Financial Innovation a Continuous
Spiral Process?, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS (2011), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805538.
27. Stefania Fusco, The Patentability of Financial Methods: The Market Participants’
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In this way, the incentives for financial innovation are no different from
other forms of innovation. Companies innovate in response to competitive
forces and customer demand. Today, competition is global and customer
demand for new products, in particular, is high.28 This puts increased
pressure on firms to not just innovate, but innovate strategically and
quickly.
C. Benefits and Costs of Financial Innovation
On the eve of the Financial Crisis, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke described the costs and benefits of financial innovation:
Financial innovation has great benefits for our economy. The
goal of regulation should be to preserve those benefits while
achieving important public policy objectives, including financial
stability, investor protection, and market integrity. Although
financial innovation promotes those objectives in some ways, for
example by allowing better sharing of risks, certain aspects of
financial innovation-including the complexity of financial
instruments and trading strategies, the illiquidity or potential
illiquidity of certain instruments, and explicit or embedded
leverage-may pose significant risks. These risks should not be
taken lightly.29
As observed by Chairman Bernanke, while innovation yields profits for the
innovator, it potentially provides benefits to the broader public as well.
The last several decades have witnessed the development of new financial
products with potential benefits to many parties. Securitization30 of
mortgages, for example, provides a mechanism for taking an illiquid asset
(residential mortgages) and making it liquid (sold as part of a securitized
pool of mortgages). Such liquidity enhances the financial stability of the
mortgage originator. Furthermore, securitized pools of assets can serve to
Perspectives, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 17 (2011) [hereinafter Fusco, Patentability of
Financial Methods].
28. See, e.g., Sridhar Balasubramanian, Insight Into Innovation: Why Companies Must
Innovate, UNC KENAN-FLAGLER NEWS (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.kenanflagler.unc.edu/news/2013/03/why-companies-must-innovate.
29. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Regulation
and Financial Innovation, Speech delivered at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2007
Financial Markets Conference, Sea Island, Georgia (May 15, 2007), transcribed at
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070515a.htm.
30. The term “securitization” has many definitions. The FDIC’s regulations define
securitization as “the issuance by an issuing entity of obligations for which the investors are
relying on the cash flow or market value characteristics and the credit quality of transferred
financial assets (together with any external credit support . . .) to repay the obligations.” 12
C.F.R. § 360.6(a)(7) (2013). For a comprehensive discussion of the term, see Jonathan C.
Lipson, Re: Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1229 (2012).
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lower the cost of credit, making loans available to more diverse borrowers.
Securitization also offers benefits to investors. Complex instruments like
tranched securitizations offer a variety of risk/return depending on investor
goals.31 Similarly, innovative derivative products offer financial benefits to
many. Such products allow firms to hedge against all kinds of risks,
ranging from changes in the price of a commodity to the default of a
contract counterparty. Moreover, innovative processes also offer wideranging benefits. The development of more and more sophisticated risk
management systems has been seen as essential to the growing
sophistication of financial products. In fact, bank regulators have come to
rely on the effectiveness of firms’ own internal risk management as an
essential part of the regulatory regime. 32 Finally, innovative organizations,
such as internet-only banks,33 allow banks to avoid costs associated with
physical location and provide convenient services to bank customers.
Other new business structures, such as the special purpose vehicle (“SPV”),
are essential to the creation of innovative financial products.34
As Chairman Bernanke also observed, however, innovation can be
costly to society. New financial products can be costly to consumers
because the product includes hidden fees or even abusive contract terms.
Investors can also suffer when complex financial products shroud inherent
risks.35 With regard to derivatives in particular, the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission found that the unregulated over-the-counter derivatives
market contributed significantly to the Financial Crisis.36 Moreover,

31. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, More than Just “New Financial Bingo”: A
Risk-Based Approach to Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (1997) (discussing
derivatives as risk management tools).
32. See generally HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 171-74 (2010) (discussing the use of internal risk
management models for purposes of setting regulatory capital requirements); Robert F.
Weber, An Alternative Story of the Law and Regulation of Risk Management, 15 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 1005 (2013) (tracing the history of the regulation of risk management in the banking
industry).
33. Ally Bank, a division of Ally Financial (formerly, GMAC), had no branches or
physical locations.
34. In a securitization, the original owner of the financial assets (e.g., mortgages)
transfers the title of those assets to a SPV. The SPV funds its acquisition of those assets by
issuing its own securities and selling those securities to investors. For an extensive
discussion of SPVs and securitization, see Gary B. Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles, Special
Purpose Vehicles and Securitization, (Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper
No. 05-21, 2005), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.713782.
35. For a full discussion of the point in the context of private-label mortgage-backed
securities, see Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100
GEO. L.J. 1177 (2012).
36. THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xxiv (Jan.
2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. The
FCIC also found mortgage securitization to be a contributing factor in the crisis. Id. at xxiii.
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institutions may be overconfident in new processes and take on
unmanageable risk. For example, financial institutions and their regulators
relied heavily on value at risk (“VaR”),37 a risk management concept
originally developed by Banker’s Trust and pioneered by J.P. Morgan.38
The reliance on VaR turned out to be quite problematic in the run up to the
Financial Crisis since measures of VaR often relied on data from relatively
short periods of time (e.g., 12 months) and underestimated the impact of
low probability events (the “fat tails” problem).39 Finally, innovative
organizations can be costly to manage and regulate if existing systems do
not translate well to the innovative structure.
II.

PATENTABILITY OF FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS

Innovation suffers if new products and services can be copied quickly
and inexpensively by competitors. Appropriability, therefore, becomes an
important consideration in innovation.40 While patent protection may
provide the appropriate incentive in some industries, such as
pharmaceuticals, it is not necessarily a good fit for others. For instance,
financial innovations have traditionally been protected by means other than
patents, including trade secrets and first mover advantages. Paul Glaser, a
Citigroup executive, once observed about financial innovation:
When an innovation like mortgage-backed securities appears,
specialist teams are quickly staffed and equipped at any bank that
wants to get into the market. New hardware is deployed and
software is written to support the instrument within months.
Compare that to the speed of innovation at General Motors, for
example. It will take seven years to bring its Saturn automobile
to market . . . .41
The speed at which financial innovation occurs was one reason the
37. VaR is a statistical model used to estimate the maximum amount that a given
portfolio of financial assets is likely to lose over a specified period of time.
38. GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P.
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 33-34
(2009).
39. For a detailed discussion of the problems with risk management systems prior to the
Financial Crisis, see THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL
BANKING
CRISIS.
FIN.
SRVS.
AUTH.
(Mar.
2009),
available
at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf.
40. “Appropriability” refers to the mechanisms by which firms seek to recoup their
investment in innovation. Robert P. Merges, The Uninvited Guest: Patents on Wall Street,
(UC Berkeley Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 126 2003),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=410900.
41. Paul F. Glaser, The Intersection of Technology and Financial Services, in
INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE MARKETS: A REORDERING OF THE WORLD’S CAPITAL
MARKET SYSTEMS 13, 18 (Daniel R. Siegel, ed., 1990).
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industry historically did not rely on patents. Another was the widely held
belief that financial innovations and other business methods were simply
not subject to patent protection.
A.

Protecting Financial Innovation

Innovation is protected and incentivized in myriad ways. The United
States has four primary intellectual property regimes—copyright,
trademark, patent, and trade secret—and each varies in scope, subject
matter, and period of protection.42 Some of our most economically
important industries rely heavily on intellectual property rights for success,
including entertainment, automotive, electronics, semiconductor, and
pharmaceutical, to name just a few.43 How best to safeguard innovation
will not only depend on the industry, but will also be influenced by the
nature of the innovative product/process, the innovator’s size and
resources, and the innovator’s ultimate objectives in seeking intellectual
property protection.
To be sure, the use of patents to protect innovative works is much
more common today than in the past. The number of patents issued by the
PTO increased five-fold between 1963 and 2012.44 This rapid growth of
patent activity is attributable to various factors, such as the expanding
concept of patentable subject matter, the explosion of innovation resulting
from the digital revolution, and the establishment of the Federal Circuit.45
Yet, in a study of manufacturing firms, Cohen found that “patents are
still not the major mechanism for appropriating returns to innovations in
most industries. Instead, we find that the key appropriability mechanisms
in most industries are secrecy, lead time and complementary capabilities
[e.g., sales, marketing, service].”46 Historically, these innovation norms
42. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 26-27 (Vicki Been et. al. eds., 6th ed. 2012).
43. See, e.g., Cecilia H. Gonzalez, Juliana M. Cofrancesco & Nikole R. Salata, The
Parallel Universes of the US ITC & the District Courts, 10 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE
JOURNAL 167, 167 (2009) (discussing the increasing importance of intellectual property in
the U.S. economy and its effects on the USITC and district courts).
44. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963-2012,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf.
45. See Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 42, at 127-28 (listing the principal
modes of legal protection for various types of intellectual work); John R. Allison &
Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 991
(2003) (noting the increase in patents on internet business methods after the Federal Circuit
decision in State Street).
46. Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent
(Or Not) 24, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at
http://www.business.otago.ac.nz/econ/courses/econ304/NBER_patent_paper.pdf.
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carried over to the financial services industry as well. In examining cross
border securitizations, for example, Frankel observed that financial
institutions rarely seek patents to protect the value of their innovations but
are rewarded in other ways, like reputational gains, tacit knowledge, and
first mover advantages.47 Indeed, at one time, patents were not an apparent
option for financial institutions because their innovations consisted mostly
of business methods, which were deemed improper subject matter.48 That
changed in the late 1990s, however, with the Federal Circuit’s decision in
State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group.49
B.

State Street and the Patentability of Business Methods

Patentability rests on five essential elements: proper subject matter,
utility, novelty, non-obviousness, and disclosure.50 Although inventions
must satisfy all of these requirements to be patentable, the proper subject
matter requirement is of particular importance for financial innovations.
With regard to subject matter, § 101 of the U.S. Patent Act provides:
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.”51 The Act further defines a process as “process,
art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine,
manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”52 Thus, methods clearly
constitute patentable subject matter, but the Act leaves open the question as
to whether § 101 encompasses all kinds of methods–including financial
and other business methods–or whether it is limited to more traditional
subject matter, such as chemical processes and methods of manufacturing.53
47. Tamar Frankel, Cross-Border Securitizations: Without Law, But Not Lawless, 8
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 255 (1998); see also TETT, supra note 38, at 20 (“In banking,
however, patents haven’t traditionally been an option.”); John F. Duffy & John A. Squires,
Disclosure and Financial Patents: Revealing the Invisible Hand, 1, 3 (Suomen Pankki
Bank of Finland & Centre for Econ. Policy Research Conference, Oct. 2010) (“Trade
secrecy has long been one of the primary, and perhaps even the primary, legal engine by
which financial firms could keep their innovations proprietary.”) (emphasis in original),
available at http://www.suomenpankki.fi/en/tutkimus/konferenssit/konferenssit_tyopajat/
Documents/CEPR2008/CEPR2008_DuffySquires_paper.pdf.
48. See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1994) abrogated by In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that business methods do not constitute
statutory subject matter).
49. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F. 3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
50. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (discussing subject matter and utility); §102 (defining novelty);
§103 (defining non-obviousness); § 112 (defining disclosure).
51. 35 U.S.C. §101 (emphasis added).
52. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (emphasis added).
53. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3239 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating
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Whether the fast moving advances in the business world are proper
subject matter for patentability purposes is a question with a long, complex,
and somewhat inconsistent history. Several justices of the Supreme Court
recently explained that “[f]or centuries, it was considered well established
that a series of steps for conducting business was not, in itself,
patentable.”54 That position is substantiated by a 1908 Second Circuit
decision in which the court held that a method of bookkeeping “designed to
prevent frauds and peculation by waiters and cashiers in hotels and
restaurants” was merely a “system of transacting business” and, thus, not
patentable subject matter.55 Still, other evidence tends to show that
business methods were in fact patentable in the early years of our nation. A
recent study by Michael Risch identifies a number of business method
patents issued in the nineteenth century.56 Indeed, the earliest business
method patent in the financial services industry dates back to a 1799
invention titled “Detecting Counterfeit Notes.”57
Further complicating the question of whether business methods are
patentable is the fact that most modern business methods are embodied in
computer software. While a software-embodied business method may
constitute a “process” under § 101, attempts to patent software often collide
with the long-established rule that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas are not patentable subject matter.58 In Gottschalk v. Benson,
for example, the Supreme Court held that a software program that
converted binary-coded decimals into pure binary numerals was not
patentable based on a “natural principles” exception to § 101.59 In doing
so, the Court emphasized that its decision did not preclude the patentability
of software programs per se. Rather, the Court found that in this particular
case the mathematical formula for converting decimals into binary code
had no practical application outside of its use in computers. Therefore,
granting a patent on the software at issue “in practical effect would be a
patent on the algorithm itself.”60
that “the text of § 101 does not on its face convey the scope of patentable processes”).
54. Id. at 3232 (Stevens, J. concurring).
55. Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
56. Michael Risch, America’s First Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279, 1320 (2012).
57. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, A USPTO White Paper: Automated Financial
or Management Data Processing Methods (Business Methods) at 2, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/whitepaper.pdf.
58. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3221; Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 585 (1978); see also Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness
and No Closer to the Promise Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed
Opportunity to Return Patent Law to its Technological Moorings, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289,
1295-96 (2011) (discussing origins of “natural principles” and their exceptions to patentable
subject matter).
59. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
60. Id. at 72.
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Almost a decade later, the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Diehr came
to a different conclusion and upheld a software patent under § 101.61 In
Diehr, the claimed invention was a computer-implemented process for
molding uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products.62
Although the PTO rejected the patent application on the grounds that the
claims were drawn to nonstatutory subject matter, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (predecessor to the Federal Circuit) reversed.63 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the lower court’s decision
that the invention constituted patentable subject matter. In support of its
decision, the Court distinguished the facts of Diehr from those of
Gottschalk:
[T]he respondents here do not seek to patent a mathematical
formula. Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of
curing synthetic rubber. Their process admittedly employs a
well-known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to preempt the use of that equation. Rather, they seek only to foreclose
from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the
other steps in their claimed process . . . . Obviously, one does not
need a “computer” to cure natural or synthetic rubber, but if the
computer use incorporated in the process patent significantly
lessens the possibility of “overcuring” or “undercuring,” the
process as a whole does not thereby become unpatentable subject
matter.64
The Diehr claims, in other words, did not seek patent protection for a
mathematical algorithm in the abstract.65 Instead, the claims sought
protection for a software-embodied process that used an algorithm to
“[perform] a function which the patent laws were designed to protect”–
namely, to transform or reduce an article to a different state or thing.66
Following the decision in Diehr, software patents were often treated as
“conventional industrial processes that were accomplished using a
computer, which computer just happened to run software.”67 Eventually,
though, this hide-the-software game came to an end. In State Street Bank
& Trust Co. v. Signature Fin.l Grp.,68 the Federal Circuit was squarely
faced with the question of whether a business method embodied in software
constituted patentable subject matter under § 101.
61. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
62. Id. at 177.
63. Id. at 179-81.
64. Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 192.
66. Id.
67. Merges, supra note 40, at 3.
68. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The system facilitated partnership (i.e., favorable)
tax treatment. In this sense, it is an example of regulatory arbitrage.
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The invention in State Street was a financial process that calculated
and allocated costs, expenses, profits, etc. among related mutual funds.69
Like most financial patents, plaintiff Signature’s patent fell within Class
705 of the PTO’s patent classification system, which is described as “Data
Processing: Financial Business Practice, Management, or Cost/Price
Determination.”70 At the trial court, defendant State Street moved for
summary judgment on the ground that the patent was invalid under § 101.
The district court agreed and granted summary judgment. Signature
appealed to the Federal Circuit.71
In a seminal opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded,
concluding that the patent claims were directed toward statutory subject
matter.72 On its way to this decision, the Federal Circuit grappled with two
difficult issues: (1) the patentability of business methods and (2) the
patentability of software inventions that use mathematical algorithms.
With respect to the former, the Federal Circuit struck down what the trial
judge had called the “business methods exception” to patentability.73 The
court explained that this exception was “ill-conceived” because nothing in
§ 101 suggested that business methods should be treated differently than
other types of processes.74 Business method patents are proper subject
matter, the court reasoned, as long as they satisfy the other requirements of
patentability—utility, novelty, non-obviousness, and disclosure—and do
not fall within the natural principles exception to § 101.75
Turning then to the natural principles exception, the Federal Circuit
held that the invention at issue in State Street was not a law of nature,
physical phenomenon, or abstract idea.76 As in Diehr, the invention was
not merely a mathematical algorithm in the abstract, but a process that
utilized a mathematical algorithm to produce a “useful, concrete and
tangible result”—namely “a final share price momentarily fixed for
recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon by
regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades.”77 Because the software
69. Id. at 1370.
70. Allison & Tiller, supra note 45, at 1025 (referring to PTO’s patent classification
system—“Data Processing: Financial Business Practice, Management, or Cost/Price
Determination.”). “The PTO created Class 705 in 1997 [(the year before State Street)] from
the business and cost/price subclasses of Classes 395 and 364.” Id. “There are other classes
of patents that are relevant to financial services. For example, Class 109 is for safes, bank
protection or related device; Class 453 is for coin handling; and Class 283 covers printed
matter including checks and deposit slips.” Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1375-77.
74. Id. at 1373, 1375-1377.
75. Id. at 1375-77.
76. Id. at 1375-77.
77. Id. at 1373 (internal quotations omitted).
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algorithm could be applied in a useful way, the Federal Circuit concluded it
was proper statutory subject matter under § 101.78
In January 1999, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in State Street,
allowing the Federal Circuit’s decision to stand. Shortly thereafter, in
AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’n, Inc.,79 the Federal Circuit was given
another chance to consider the patentability of business methods. Relying
on State Street, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that business methods were
not categorically excluded under § 101 and held that the method at issue in
AT&T—a process for billing telephone calls at different rates depending on
the long-distance carrier used—was patentable.80
C.

Reactions to the State Street Decision

State Street took many by surprise and triggered strong negative
reactions from commentators, businesspeople, and legislators alike. Some
scholars argued that State Street expanded the concept of patentable subject
matter in a way that threatened the integrity of our patent system.81 Others
did not object to the patentability of business methods on subject matter
grounds, but instead worried that the PTO would improperly grant business
method patents for inventions that lacked novelty or were obvious because
of inadequate written prior art in the field.82
Yet, it was corporate America’s outcry about business method patents
that garnered real attention, most importantly from Congress. The business
world was convinced that State Street would wreak havoc on industry
(particularly financial services) by embroiling companies in frivolous
lawsuits over patents that never should have been issued in the first place.83
78. Id.
79. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
80. Id. at 1357-58.
81. See, e.g., Alan L. Durham, “Useful Arts” in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L.
REV. 1419, 1526-28 (1999) (exploring State Street’s aftermath and predicting an increase in
patents on “non-technological” innovations”); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal
Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139 (1999) [hereinafter, Thomas, Liberal Professions]
(discussing how State Street presents the latest in a series of cases testing the boundaries of
the “useful arts”).
82. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for
Business?, 16 Santa Clara COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 268-69 (2000) (arguing that
the standards for novelty and obviousness are not absolute and will be adjusted for business
method patents); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics Agenda for
the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2090 (2000) (explaining that for areas like
business methods which were traditionally thought of as ineligible for patent protection,
patent examiners have few sources of prior art).
83. See, e.g., Robert M. Kunstadt, Opening Pandora’s Box, THE RECORDER, Jan. 1999,
at 29 available at LEXIS (predicting a “large-scale disruption of U.S. commerce, as sharp
operators move to patent business methods and assert patents against the unsuspecting”);
Josh McHugh, Barbed Wire on the Internet, FORBES, May 17, 1999, at 183 (stating that
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While some deemed this reaction “hysterical,”84 Congress responded in
record time by enacting the First Inventor Defense Act of 1999 to stem the
impact of State Street. Congress did not reverse the Federal Circuit’s
holding that business methods constitute patentable subject matter under §
101, but rather created an infringement defense for an inventor of a
business method that was later patented by another.85 The Act, sponsored
by Senator Schumer of New York, provided for a stop-gap measure that
protected alleged infringers from suit as long as they (i) reduced the
business method to practice at least one year before the effective filing date
of the patent, and (ii) commercially used the method before the effective
filing date.86 In other words, Congress established “prior user rights” for
business method patents.
Like Congress, the PTO also took steps to mitigate the impact of State
Street. In 2000, the agency launched various initiatives and instituted new
examination procedures to enhance the quality of business method
patents.87 First, the PTO planned to hire and specially train additional
examiners who were qualified to review business method/Class 705
applications.88 Second, the PTO established industry outreach programs to
encourage dialogue about business method patents and expand the PTO’s
prior art database for better searching.89 Finally, the PTO put in place
various quality control mechanisms for business method patents, including
a second level—or “second pair of eyes”—review of Class 705
applications.90

patents may become “the barbed wire of the Internet”); Jaret Seidberg, Ruling Threatens
Banks With Patent Lawsuits, AM. BANKER, Sept. 2, 1998, at 3 (positing that State Street will
bring hundreds of patent infringement suits to the financial services industry).
84. See Carol B. Oberdorfer, “Boom” in Business Method Patent Filings Has Followed
State Street Ruling, PTO Says, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPR. J. (BNA), Dec. 10, 1998, at 115
(discussing the reactions of banks and businesses affected by the State Street ruling).
85. PUB. L. NO. 106-113, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-555. In 2000 and 2001,
additional bills addressing business method patents were introduced in Congress, but failed
to gain traction. Allison & Tiller, supra note 45, at 1021-24.
86. PUB. L. NO. 106-113, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-555; 145 CONG. REC.
S14,836 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999) (statement of Sen. Schumer) (justifying the prior user
defense as providing certainty for the financial services industry in “the face of uncertainty
presented by the Federal Circuit’s decision in the State Street case”). Of course, this
commercial use had to be “secret” or else otherwise it would constitute invalidating prior art
against the patented invention.
87. USPTO White Paper, supra note 57, at 1.
88. Id. at 9-10.
89. Id. at 22; Business Method Patents: Hearings on H.R. 1332 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. On Courts, the Internet & Intell. Prop., 107th Cong. 48
(2001) (statement of Nicholas P. Godici, Acting Under Secretary of Commerce for
Intellectual Property and Acting Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).
90. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Patent Quality Improvement: Expansion of the
Second-Pair-of-Eyes Review,

448

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 16:2

Though these congressional and administrative measures assuaged
some immediate concerns over State Street, the debate over business
method patents persisted.91 In the years following the Federal Circuit’s
decision, the number of business method patents granted by the PTO
steadily rose, and critics continued to question the wisdom and legality of
this practice.92 Moreover, as predicted in the wake of State Street, this
increase in business method patents brought with it a proliferation of
infringement litigation—ultimately leading to renewed calls for reform.
III.

BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS FROM STATE STREET TO BILSKI

State Street naturally caused alarm for the banking world since the
case involved financial institutions and financial products.93 But the
decision affected a number of other industries as well, particularly the
emerging high tech sector. To be sure, State Street was decided at the
height of the dot-com era when a slew of new business methods on
purchasing, advertising, and other Internet-related activities were
introduced.94 With this convergence of circumstances, it is no small
wonder that the past decade or so has witnessed an explosion of business
method patents and litigation surrounding these patents.
A. The Rise of Business Method Patents
State Street sparked a significant uptick in applications for business
method patents, and, at least initially, the number of Class 705 patents
granted by the PTO correspondingly rose.95 Before State Street, the most
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/action/q3p17a.htm (last visited Nov. 20,
2013); see also USPTO White Paper, supra note 57, at 21 (discussing the recommendation
to expand the two-tiered review).
91. See Allison & Tiller, supra note 45, at 1007-17 (illuminating the ongoing debate in
the wake of State Street).
92. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving
Patent Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 729, 730-31 (2006).
93. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the financial industry’s
reaction to State Street).
94. See Thomas, Liberal Professions, supra note 81, at 1140 (providing that following
State Street, applicants “besieged the Patent Office with applications” [for] Internet-based
business models” and other software.).
95. See id. (discussing how applicants seized upon State Street to seek patents for
applications including financial software and Internet-based business models); Allison &
Tiller, supra note 45, at 991 (explaining that software-embodied patents had been issued
before State Street, but that number grew significantly after the decision); Carol B.
Oberdorfer, Patents: “Boom” in Business Method Patent Filings Has Following State
Street Ruling, PTO Says, Trademark & Copyright Daily (BNA), No. 57, at 115 (Dec. 10,
1998) (explaining that the PTO expected 300 business method-related patents in the first
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Class 705 patents granted in a year since 1992 was 249; that number
increased to 489 in 1998, 720 in 1999, and 736 in 2000.96 Between 2001
and 2004, however, there was a marked decline in issued business method
patents compared to the previous three years,97 most likely resulting from
the PTO’s heightened examination procedures for these types of
inventions.98 That trend began to reverse itself in 2005 when the PTO
granted 776 business method patents; by 2009, that number had grown to
just shy of 2000.99
Although we know that Class 705/business method patents have
increased since State Street, it is difficult to ascertain which of these patents
support financial products. That difficulty stems, at least in part, from the
lack of consensus on a definition for financial products.100 Still, a few
scholars have undertaken empirical studies to collect more precise data on
financial patenting, for example by eliminating certain subclasses of 705
patents or using key word searches to capture patents that were improperly
classified.101 Despite using different methodologies, each of these
empirical studies reaches the same conclusion: the number of financial
patents has steadily risen.
Yet, it is important to bear in mind that financial patents are only one
subset of business methods patents issued by the PTO.102 Indeed, one study
year following State Street).
96. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Patent Statistics, Patent Counts by Class
by Year Report, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.pdf
(last modified April 2, 2013).
97. See id. (detailing that in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004, there were 485, 458,
444, and 323 Class 705 patents granted, respectively.).
98. See supra notes 87-90 (discussing additional measures taken by the PTO with
respect to business method patents). In 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004, there were 485, 458,
444, and 323 Class 705 patents granted, respectively.
99. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Patent Statistics, Patent Counts by Class
by Year Report, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.pdf
(last modified April 2, 2013).
100. See, e.g., Josh Lerner, The Litigation of Financial Innovations, 53 J.L. & ECON. 807,
810 n.3 (2010) [hereinafter Lerner, Financial Innovations] (noting that “financial patents”
could encompass innovations stemming from “banking, investing, payment systems,
securities issuances, and trading”).
101. See Stefania Fusco, Is the Use of Patents Promoting the Creation of New Types of
Securities?, 25 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 243, 263-64 (2009) (analyzing
patents based on dividing financial securities into macro-categories); Robert M. Hunt,
Business Method Patents and U.S. Financial Services, 1 (Feb. 2009), Supercedes Working
Paper
No.
07-21,
available
at
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-anddata/publications/working-papers/2008/wp08-10.pdf; Josh Lerner, Where Does State Street
Lead? A First Look at Finance Patents, 1971-2000, 5-7 (HBS FINANCE WORKING PAPER
NO. 01-005, May 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=224895 (analyzing financial
formula and method patents); Josh Lerner, The Two-Edged Sword: The Competitive
Implications of Financial Patents (2003) (on file with author).
102. Hunt, supra note 101, at 4.
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estimates that less than one-tenth of all Class 705 patents are assigned to
banks and other financial firms,103 while the majority are issued to
companies in the high tech sector like IBM, Microsoft, and Amazon. 104 In
2012, for example, the PTO granted IBM, Microsoft, and Amazon 262, 87,
and 103 Class 705 patents, respectively.105 To be sure, it was the litigation
over these high tech business method patents, especially Amazon’s “oneclick” patent, that helped spur the outcry for reform.
B. Business Method Patent Litigation
It should come as no surprise that the number of patent suits filed in
federal court has increased as the PTO has issued more patents.106 In the
past twenty-odd years, however, the rise in patent litigation has outpaced
the increase in patent grants.107 In fact, patent litigation is rising at a faster
rate than any other type of civil litigation.108 While there is no single cause
of this surge in patent litigation, allowing patents on business methods has
been a contributing factor.
Recent studies demonstrate that business method patents are indeed
litigated at a significantly greater rate than other types of patents.109
103. Id.
104. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Statistics, Class 705, DP: Financial,
Business Practice, Management, or Cost/Price Determination (Data Processing) 1969-2012,
Extended Year Set – Patenting in Technology Classes, Breakout by Organization, available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasga/705_torg.htm
[hereinafter
USPTO Statistics, Class 705, Breakout by Organization] (identifying the above mentioned
companies as being among the top ten receivers of such patents from 1969-2012).
105. Id.
106. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Statistics, Calendar Years 1963-2011,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf.
107. Compare James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 127 (Princeton Univ. Press 2008)
(stating that ten times more patent suits were filed in U.S. federal courts in 2006 than in
1990) with U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 19632011,
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf.
(demonstrating that 2.5 times more patents were issued by the USPTO in 2006 than 1990).
108. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, F. Scott Kieff, Lawrence Sung & Thomas Woolston,
The New Private Ordering of Intellectual Property: The Emergence of Contracts as the
Drivers of Intellectual Property Rights, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 5, 57 n.69 (2009); Lerner,
Financial Innovations, supra note 100, at 818.
109. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 107, at 213-14 (detailing how software patents
are different than other patents as they are “particularly prone to litigation and to disputes
over patent boundaries . . . .”); John R. Allison, Emerson H. Tiller & Samanth Zyontz,
Patent Litigation and the Internet, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012) (finding that
Internet patents are between 7.5 and 9.5 times more likely to end up in infringement
litigation); Lerner, Financial Innovations, supra note 100, at 818-19 (describing how the
litigation rate for the most litigated technology group (drug and health) is still 7% less than
the rate for financial patents).
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Several theories may explain this phenomenon. For one, business method
patents tend to have “unclear boundaries” that make infringement claims
easier to assert against a broader group of potential defendants.110 Another
possibility is that alleged infringers may be less willing to license and more
willing to litigate business method patents because of questions
surrounding their validity. Perhaps, instead, business method patents are
litigated at higher rates because they are frequently owned by patent
assertion entities (“PAEs”) rather than by competitors.111 Whatever the
reason, the fact remains that business method patents end up in court more
often than other types of patents.
Since State Street, business method patent litigation has spread
throughout the country. These suits have been filed in a number of
different jurisdictions and involve a variety of inventions and litigants.112
This Article highlights just a few of these litigation stories with a focus on
high profile cases involving high tech and financial business method
patents.
C. High Tech Business Method Patent Litigation
The list of patent suits involving high tech companies and high tech
business methods is long.113 Yet a couple of these cases are worth
mentioning because of their impact on the patent reform effort. In the 2001
“one-click patent” litigation, Amazon sued Barnes and Noble (“B&N”) for
infringing U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411, which claimed a method of online
shopping.114 The district court granted a preliminary injunction and
required B&N to remove from its website a competing streamlined
purchasing feature.115 The decision drew sharp criticism from members of
the high tech community and scholars who were convinced that the PTO
110. Id. at 187; Allison, Tiller & Zyontz, supra note 109, at 5.
111. See infra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing patent assertion entities).
112. See Lerner, Financial Innovation, supra note 100, at 809-17; Allison, Tiller &
Zyontz, supra note 109, at 39-82; Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings:
Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1600
(2009) [hereinafter Chien, Of Trolls] (describing how patent litigation is brought by entities
ranging from private and public corporations to nonprofits).
113. See e.g., Chien, Of Trolls, supra note 112, at 1573-77 (mentioning the high profile
patent suits involving Qualcomm and Broadcom).
114. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F.Supp.2d 1228 (W.D. Wash.
1999); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet at 20: Evolution of a Constitution for Cyberspace,
20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1115, 1138 (2012) (“The one-click method reduced the
number of steps a consumer must take to order an item from an e-commerce site, and
relieved a consumer from having to reenter all of his basic information, such as name,
address, and credit card information.”).
115. Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1249; John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in the
Patent Law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 569, 577 (2002) [hereinafter, Thomas, Liberty and Property].
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never should have granted the patent in the first place.116 Some argued that
business methods should not constitute patentable subject matter, while
others claimed that such patents should have been rejected on novelty or
obviousness grounds.117 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit vacated the
preliminary injunction, and the parties settled the dispute.118 Nevertheless,
the “one-click” patent litigation became the poster child for everything
wrong with our patent system.
Though Amazon v. Barnes & Noble is probably the most notorious
business method patent suit, others have garnered significant attention too.
Since the late 1990s, for example, Walker Digital has filed a series of
lawsuits against technology companies like Microsoft, Google, Facebook,
Amazon, Yahoo, and others for patent infringement.119 While defendants
have won a few of these cases on the merits,120 the vast majority of such
cases end in settlements totaling tens of millions of dollars.121 According to
its website, Walker Digital is a “privately held research and development
lab” led by Jay Walker, the co–founder of Priceline.com and owner of
hundreds of patents—most famously the reverse auction patent.122 In 1999,
Forbes spotlighted Mr. Walker in an article, suggesting he is “an Edison
for a new age.”123 In addition, Time magazine twice named Walker as one
116. See Peter R. Lando, Business Method Patents: Update Post State Street, 9 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 403, 404-05 (2001) (explaining critics’ belief that the PTO mistakenly
issued many business method patents because the Office was overworked, understaffed, and
used search databases that were antiquated and ill-suited for such patent applications).
117. See, e.g., id.; Margo A. Bagley, Internet Business Model Patents: Obvious by
Analogy, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 260-1 (2001) (arguing that business
method patents often resemble what are normally considered un-patentable “ideas”).
118. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Thomas, Liberty and Property, supra note 115, at 577.
119. See, e.g., Robert M. Hunt, You Can Patent That?, PHILA. FED. RESERVE BANK BUS.
REVIEW 2001(Q1): 5-15, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelproperty
comments/youcanpatentthat.pdf (explaining Walker Digital’s decision to sue Microsoft’s
Expedia Travel Service for infringing its patent on Priceline.com’s “reverse auction”
process); John Letzing, Founder of Priceline Spoiling for a Fight Over Tech Patents, THE
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904070604576516211224146034.html
(explaining that Walker Digital has filed 30 patent infringement lawsuits aimed at hundreds
of companies).
120. See Walker Digital, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2011-1419 (Fed Cir. 2012)
(upholding summary judgment of non-infringement in favor of Microsoft).
121. See, e.g., Josh Lowensohn, Report: Apple, Groupon Settle Walker Digital IP Suits,
CNET.COM (July 22, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27076_3-20082292-248/reportapple-groupon-settle-walker-digital-ip-suits/ (reporting that the settlement topped $25
million).
122. About Us:
The Company, WALKER DIGITAL WEBSITE (2011),
http://www.walkerdigital.com/about-us_the-company.html.
123. Dylan Machan, An Edison for a New Age?, Forbes (May 17, 1999), available at
http://www.forbes.com/global/1999/0517/0210020a.html.
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of the “50 most influential business leaders of the digital age.”124
Yet, in the eyes of many, Walker Digital and companies like it are
nothing more than unscrupulous patent trolls who thwart innovation by
forcing defendants to divert resources from research and development to
litigation.125 So, beginning in the early 2000s, Microsoft, Oracle, and other
high tech leaders called for patent reform.126 These companies pushed hard
for an overhaul of the patent system,127 and Congress responded by
introducing the first patent reform bill in 2005.128 Although it would take
another six years for Congress to pass the AIA (as discussed later in the
Article), these early efforts by the high tech industry undoubtedly played a
key role in patent reform.
D. Financial Business Method Patent Litigation
Federal courts have also witnessed a spike in litigation involving
financial business method patents. In fact, empirical evidence shows that
within the category of business methods, patents related to financial
innovations are especially likely to become the subject of a lawsuit.129
Thus, for the past decade, many financial institutions with little prior patent
experience have found themselves in court facing infringement charges,
injunctions, and steep damage awards.130
One early chapter of this litigation story involved eSpeed, the
electronic bond-trading subsidiary of Cantor Fitzgerald LP.131 Around the
late 1990s, eSpeed started building its portfolio of business method patents

124. About Us: The Company, supra note 122 (internal quotations omitted).
125. See Martin Campbell-Kelly, Not All Bad: An Historical Perspective on Software
Patents, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 200-01 (2005) (describing hostility
towards entities that obtain and enforce low quality patents); Letzing, supra note 119
(discussing concerns that the spike in patent litigation will have a chilling effect on
innovation).
126. McCullagh, supra note 7; Interview with Brad Smith, Senior Vice President,
General Counsel and Corporate Secretary, Microsoft Corporation, in Washington, D.C.
(Mar. 10, 2005), available at http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/features/2005/
mar05/03-10patentreform.aspx.
127. Chien, Of Trolls, supra note 112, at 1576; Coalition for Patent Fairness Website,
available at http://www.patentfairness.org/learn/why/.
128. Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2005-06).
129. Lerner, Financial Innovation, supra note 100, at 827 (finding that financial patents
are litigated two to three dozen times more frequently than patents as a whole).
130. See id. at 807, 826 (concluding that financial firms are especially likely to be
targeted and named as defendants in patent litigation actions.).
131. Marius Meland, eSpeed Seeks Up to $64M in Patent Suit Over Bond Trading
System,
Law
360
(May
27,
2004),
available
at
http://www.law360.com/articles/1523/espeed-seeks-up-to-64m-in-patent-suit-over-bondtrading-system.
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related to electronic trading of futures and other commodities.132 Lawsuits
against several exchanges and other financial entities ensued, with many of
the early cases ending in lucrative settlements for eSpeed.133 Litigation
involving just one eSpeed patent, for instance, resulted in approximately
$50 million in revenue from settlement.134 These high payouts not only
spurred eSpeed to file additional infringement actions, but also inspired
competitors to pursue patent litigation of their own.135
While eSpeed sustained a widespread litigation campaign, it does not
compare to DataTreasury. DataTreasury, a company founded by inventor
Claudio Ballard, has sued more than seventy financial services firms for
infringing its check-processing patents.136 DataTreasury has litigated
against major financial institutions like Bank of America, Citibank, J.P.
Morgan, and Wells Fargo, all of which have settled and agreed to pay hefty
licensing fees.137 The one bank that proceeded to trial, U.S. Bancorp,
suffered a huge loss when the patents were upheld and DataTreasury was
awarded more than $50 million in damages.138 After filing an appeal, U.S.
Bancorp ended up settling as well.139 To date, DataTreasury has collected
an estimated $400 million in settlement/licensing fees since it began
enforcing its patents just over a decade ago.140
132. Phillipa Leighton-Jones, Chicago Exchanges Settle Patent Litigation with eSpeed,
FINANCIAL NEWS (Aug. 27, 2002), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2002-0827/chicago-exchanges-settle-patent-litigation-with-espeed.
133. Id.; Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select
Innovation Regimes, 199 YALE L.J. 384, 419 (2009); Marius Meland, eSpeed, Nymex Settle
Patent Dispute Over Trading Technology, LAW 360 (Dec. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.law360.com/articles/665/espeed-nymex-settle-patent-dispute-over-tradingtechnology; Press Release, eSpeed and New York Mercantile Exchange Reach Settlement
Agreement on Wagner Patent (Dec. 22, 2003), available at
http://www.espeed.com/articles/article20031222.htm.
134. Meland, supra note 133, at 1.
135. See, e.g., Marius Meland, Competition: Incentive to Protect Proprietary Business
Methods, LAW 360 (Jan. 31, 2006), available at
http://www.law360.com/articles/5169/competition-incentive-to-protect-proprietarybusiness-methods (describing how companies, such as Trading Technologies International
Inc., have sued on similar patent infringement grounds).
136. Barnett, supra note 133, at 419; Jan Wolfe, Herrick, Weil Knock Out investor’s Suit
Against DataTreasury, AM LAW LITIGATION DAILY (May 14, 2013), available at
http://www.americanlawyer.com/digestTAL.jsp?id=1202600128424&Herrick_Weil_Knock
_Out_Investors_Suit_Against_DataTreasury&slreturn=20130514000239.
137. Id.
138. Jackie Stewart, DataTreasury, U.S. Bancorp Settles Image-Capture Patent Dispute,
AM. BANKER (Dec. 27, 2011),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_249/datatreasury-us-bancorp-item-capturepatent-1045195-1.html.
139. Id.
140. Robert Sterne, et al., America Invents Act: The 5 New Post-Issuance Procedures,
13 SEDONA CONF. J. 27 (2012).
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Calling DataTreasury a thorn in the side of the financial industry is
putting it mildly. When attempts to knock out DataTreasury’s patents in
court failed,141 banks looked for other ways to eliminate the threat. They
initially turned to the PTO, but DataTreasury’s patents survived
reexamination.142 The banks then sought relief from Congress, lobbying
Senators Schumer, Sessions, and others for a legislative solution.143 The
2007 and 2009 versions of the patent reform bill included provisions
preventing DataTreasury from collecting patent infringement damages
from banks.144 This approach was problematic, however, because it
arguably constituted a taking of private property that would require the
government to compensate DataTreasury.145 Meanwhile, as the banks and
their congressional allies searched for alternative solutions, the courts were
taking a hard look at business method patents too.
E. Bilski
Questions about business method patents persisted after State Street.
It was one thing for the Federal Circuit to say that business methods
constitute patentable subject matter,146 but another to establish criteria by
which the patentability of those inventions could be assessed. In a series of
cases since State Street, the courts have addressed § 101 patent eligibility
for diverse technologies, including transitory signals,147 diagnostic
methods,148 isolated DNA sequences,149 and, most pertinent to this Article,
methods of doing business.150
141. Stewart, supra note 138.
142. Sterne, supra note 140, at 27.
143. See Barnett, supra note 133, at 425 (lobbying for relaxed legislation on patent
restrictions); Letter from the Coalition of Patent Fairness to The Honorable Harry Reid,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, and The Honorable Mitch McConnell, Republican Leader,
U.S. Senate, Jan. 22, 2008, http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=249 (urging Congress
to pass patent reform legislation in order to promote innovation, growth, and balance in the
patent system).
144. Barnett, supra note 133, at n.92; Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Lawmakers Move to Grant
Banks Immunity Against Patent Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/02/13/AR2008021303731_pf.html.
145. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Birnbaum, supra note 144, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/13/
AR2008021303731_pf.html.
146. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F. 3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
147. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
148. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
149. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
150. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010); In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
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The first of the business method cases was In re Comiskey, which
concerned a patent application directed toward a method for conducting
mandatory arbitration.151 In that case, the PTO rejected Comiskey’s
application as obvious and the Federal Circuit affirmed, but on different
grounds. Specifically, the court held that Comiskey’s claims failed to
satisfy § 101 because they were merely mental processes untied to a
machine or other class of statutory subject matter; in short, the claims were
simply abstract ideas.152 The Federal Circuit’s decision to rely on § 101,
rather than § 103, was notable because it signaled to the patent community
a reigning in of the broad “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test
announced a decade earlier in State Street.153
This trend away from State Street and toward a more demanding §
101 analysis continued in In re Bilski. Bilski involved a financial
innovation that provided a method for hedging risk in commodities
trades.154 The PTO rejected Bilski’s application under § 101, inter alia,
because the invention was not implemented on a specific apparatus.155
Although Bilski’s appeal was originally heard by a panel of the Federal
Circuit, the court sua sponte ordered en banc review before the panel
issued its decision.156 The en banc court ultimately affirmed the PTO’s
rejection, yet the decision was highly fractured with a majority opinion, a
concurrence, and three separate dissents.
As an initial matter, the majority reaffirmed the holding of State Street
that business methods are not categorically excluded from § 101.157 Aside
from that, however, State Street’s precedential control came to an end as
the majority proceeded to overrule the “useful, concrete or tangible results”
test.158 In its place, the court adopted the “machine-or-transformation” test,
which provides that a business method is patentable if it (1) is tied to a
specific machine or (2) transforms an article into a different state or
thing.159 Applying this new test, the majority held that Bilski’s method was
not statutory subject matter and therefore affirmed the PTO’s rejection.160
When the Supreme Court granted Bilski’s petition for certiorari, many
believed that sounded the death knell for business method patents. The
Court heard oral arguments in November 2009 but did not issue its decision
151. Id. The court explicitly stated that it considered Comiskey’s application as a
business method patent. Id. at 1374.
152. Id. at 1376-78.
153. State Street, 149 F. 3d at 1373.
154. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010).
155. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
156. Id. at 949.
157. Id. at 960.
158. Id. at 960 n.19.
159. Id. at 959-60.
160. Id. at 964.
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until the end of the term in June 2010.161 This unusually long delay caused
some commentators to suggest that the Court was contemplating something
ambitious, such as a complete bar of business method patents under §
101.162 Others predicted that Justice Stevens, who was retiring that year
and had consistently taken a narrow view of patent rights, was authoring
the opinion.163 Briefly heartened by these predictions, opponents of
business method patents were disappointed when they proved to be wrong.
The Supreme Court issued its decision in Bilski on the last day of the
2010 term. Contrary to expectations, Justice Kennedy authored the
majority opinion joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Scalia and the Chief
Justice.164 Justice Stevens did in fact write an opinion, but it was a
concurrence in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined.
What all the justices agreed upon was the holding: Bilski’s method for
hedging risk was not patentable subject matter.165 They disagreed, though,
on the rationale. The majority reasoned that business methods are not
categorically excluded under § 101, but that this particular method could
not be patented because it was merely an abstract idea.166 The majority
further explained that the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation test
was not the sole means of proving proper subject matter.167 Instead of
using bright-line tests, the Court said, compliance with § 101 should be
assessed on a situational basis.
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, argued that business methods are

161. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at3231.
162. See, e.g., Tom Goldstein Predicts the Outcomes (and the Authors) of the Final Four
Supreme Court Cases of this Term, ALTHOUSE (June 27, 2010),
http://althouse.blogspot.com/2010/06/tom-goldstein-predicts-outcomes-and.html; Gerard
Magliocca, Where is Bilski?, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Apr. 5, 2010),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/04/where-is-bilski.html.
163. Josh Blackman, Who Will Write Bilski?, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (June 23, 2010),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2010/06/23/who-will-write-bilski-black-pcaob-mcdonald-clsand-doe-my-final-predictions/; Goldstein, supra note 162; Joe Miller, Comment to Where is
Bilski?,
CONCURRING
OPINIONS
(Apr.
5,
2010),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/04/where-is-bilski.html.
164. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223 (2010).
165. Id. at 3221.
166. Id. at 3231 (explaining how the majority rejected a categorical exclusion of business
methods because it would be inconsistent with (1) the broad definition of “process” under
35 U.S.C. §100(b), and (2) the passage of the First Inventor Defense Act); see supra notes
85-86 (discussing prior user defense); see also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228 (discussing how
Congress would not have had to create a defense to business method patents if business
methods were not patentable.
167. Id. at 3227-28. Since Bilski, district courts have continued to apply the machine-ortransformation text. For a discussion of those cases, see Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch,
Ted Sichelman, & R. Polk Wagner, Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1319-22
(2011) (discussing cases involving the machine-or-transformation test).
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per se excluded from patentability under § 101.168 He considered § 101
through an historical lens and concluded that business methods were not
subject to patent protection in the past and should not be patentable
today.169 In Justice Stevens’s view, the Founders and Congress intended
patents to protect “useful” or “technological” arts – meaning inventions
like ships, gunpowder, paper, and stone work – not methods of doing
business.170 In sum, State Street was wrongly decided (or has been wrongly
interpreted), and it was time to fix that mistake.171
Unfortunately for the high tech and financial industries, Justice
Stevens was unable to muster a majority for this across-the-board ban on
business method patents. In the wake of Bilski, the number of Class 705
patents issued by the PTO grew rapidly,172 while lower courts continued to
struggle with the subject matter eligibility of business methods.173 If there
were any chance for meaningful change in the law, it would have to come
from Congress. Consequently, those seeking patent reform shifted their
attention back to Capitol Hill.

168. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (Stevens, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 3246 (“By the early 20th century, it was widely understood that a series of
steps for conducting business could not be patented.”). There appears to be evidence
supporting both sides of the debate about the role business method patents have played
historically. See supra Part II.B.
170. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3243-44.
171. Id. at 3248 n.40. Justice Stevens argued that State Street does not support the
position that business methods are per se patentable because that case “dealt with whether a
piece of software could be patented and addressed only claims directed at machines, not
processes.” Id.
172. Before Bilski, the PTO issued 1,177, 1,694, and 1,996 Class 705 patents in 2007,
2008, and 2009, respectively. Following Bilski the number of Class 705 patents increased to
4,059, 4,064 and 4,854 between 2010 and 2012. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
USPTO Patent Statistics, Patent Counts by Class by Year Report, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.pdf (displaying patent statistics).
173. See, e.g., CLS Bank Int’l. v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 713F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(en banc). In CLS Bank, the Federal Circuit granted en banc review to consider the subject
matter eligibility of certain claims of various business method patents held by Alice
Corporation. Although a majority of the judges agreed that the claims were not patentable
under § 101, the court issued a highly splintered decision with seven different opinions as to
the rationale. The patent owner recently filed a petition for certiorari arguing that the
Federal Circuit is “irreconcilably fractured” on § 101 questions. See Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 3, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, No. 13-___ (U.S. Sept. 4, 2013) (asking whether
computer implemented inventions are patentable subject matter). On December 6, 2013, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and oral argument is scheduled for March 31, 2014. See
Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, SCOTUSBLOG, available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/alice-corporation-pty-ltd-v-cls-bankinternational/ (last accessed Dec. 19, 2013) (listing the filings and proceedings in the case).
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BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS AND THE AIA

Several factors contributed to the call for patent reform that ultimately
culminated in the passage of the America Invents Act in 2011.174 As the
boundaries of patentability expanded,175 the number of patents issued by the
PTO skyrocketed.176 Questions abounded about the legitimacy of many of
these patents, particularly software and other business method patents.177
Along with this upsurge in patents came a rise in litigation, with ten times
more patent suits filed in U.S. federal courts in 2006 than in 1990.178 Yet, it
was not just the quantity of litigation that spawned the reform movement; it
was the quality too. Many of these patent suits were brought by PAEs—or
“trolls” as they are pejoratively called—which are companies that acquire
and assert patents but do not practice their inventions.179 PAEs tend to
litigate more aggressively than competitors because (1) there is no risk of
inviting a counterclaim for infringement of a related patent (PAEs do not
produce products), and (2) discovery is significantly less burdensome
(PAEs do not generate many documents).180 Consequently, companies
(particularly in the high tech and financial sectors) were repeatedly named
as defendants in patent infringement suits or threatened with litigation if
they did not agree to license the patents.
To make matters worse for defendants, patent owners who litigated
these suits to trial frequently won big verdicts and/or obtained injunctions.
For example, when a PAE sued Research in Motion (“RIM”), the provider
of the popular BlackBerry™ handheld device, the jury awarded the patent
owner almost $54 million in damages and the court entered a permanent
174. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284-341 (2011)
(codified as amended in scattered parts of 35 U.S.C.). One important motivating force
behind the AIA not discussed in this Article was the need for international harmonization of
our patent laws. See Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty Under the AIA, 27 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1023, 1046 (2012).
175. See, e.g., State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that business methods are patentable subject matter).
176. The number of patents issued by the PTO increased five-fold between 1963 and
2011. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963-2011,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf.
177. Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What to Do About Bad Patents,
REG., 10, 10-13 (Winter 2005).
178. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 107, at 127.
179. Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public
Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2012).
180. David H. Harper & Jason P. Bloom, Eastern District of Texas Issues New Model
Order Regarding E-Discovery in Patent Cases, HAYNES & BOONE’S NEWSROOM (October 3,
2012), http://www.haynesboone.com/new-model-order-e-discovery/ (noting the “large
discovery asymmetries . . . such as when an [NPE], which typically has little ESI to
produce, initiates an infringement suit against a larger company, which normally bears much
greater expenses for e-discovery”).
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injunction.181 When the decision was partially affirmed by the Federal
Circuit, RIM ended up settling for over $600 million.182 Microsoft too was
slapped with a number of huge verdicts in the mid-2000s, the largest
totaling $1.52 billion.183 And PAEs like DataTreasury have collected close
to half a billion dollars in licensing fees and damages from big banks and
other financial institutions.184
The convergence of these circumstances provided fertile ground for
patent reform. Microsoft, RIM, Google, and other major tech companies
claimed the patent system was broken, and they called on Congress to fix
it.185 The first patent reform bill was introduced during the 109th Congress
on June 8, 2005 by Representative Lamar Smith, then-Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee’s Intellectual Property Subcommittee.186 A
similar bill was introduced in the Senate by Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy
in 2006.187 But both bills died in committee.188 It wasn’t until the 110th
Congress, when the financial services industry took on a leadership role in
patent reform, that legislative efforts began in earnest.189
A. The Banks’ Role in Patent Reform
Although the financial industry took some interest in the earliest
patent reform efforts, it became a real priority in 2007.190 That year, bank
lobbyists (particularly the Financial Services Roundtable) stepped up their
181. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
182. Rob Kelley, BlackBerry Maker, NTP Ink $612 Million Settlement, CNN MONEY
(Mar. 3, 2006), http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/03/technology/rimm_ntp/.
183. See, e.g., Sinead Carew, Microsoft Hit With $1.52 Billion Patent Suit Damages,
REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/02/23/us-microsoft-verdictidUSWEN465120070223.
184. See supra notes 136-140 and accompanying text (discussing DataTreasury’s
litigation campaign against the finance industry).
185. See Tom Krazit, RIM Calls for Patent Reform in Newspaper Ad, CNET (Mar. 14,
2006),
http://news.cnet.com/RIM-calls-for-patent-reform-in-newspaper-ad/2100-1047_36049699.html (discussing RIM’s use of newspaper ads to raise public support to change
current patent policies); McCullagh, supra note 7; Hannibal Travis, The Future According
to Google: Technology Policy from the Standpoint of America’s Fastest-Growing
Technology Company, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 209, 218-19 (2009) (discussing Google’s view
that software patents threatened innovation).
186. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of
II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 438 (2011-12) [hereinafter “Matal Part I”].
187. Id. at 439.
188. Id.
189. Id.; Lisa Lerer, Finance Industry Leads on Patent Reform, POLITICO.COM (July 31,
2007), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0707/5187.html.
190. Id.; Patent Law Reform: Injunctions and Damages: Hearing before the Subcomm.
on Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, (109th Cong. June 14,
2005) (Prepared Statement of Jonathan Band on behalf of Visa U.S.A. and the Financial
Services Roundtable).
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efforts with Congress, and it paid off.191 In April 2007, parallel patent
reform bills were introduced in both houses of Congress.192 The bills
included a number of provisions that aren’t directly relevant to this Article,
most notably an adoption of a “first-to-file” rather than a “first-to-invent”
priority system. Yet, several features of the bills were intended to address
the problems of patent quality, including a post-grant review proceeding
that would allow patents to be challenged at the PTO rather than in
expensive and prolonged litigation.193
The high tech and financial sectors applauded the proposed legislation
and encouraged Congress to move forward with the reform effort.194 But
there were powerful dissenting voices too, especially from the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.195 Dissenters argued that the
new laws would weaken the patent system and hamper innovation.196 This
schism forced Congress back to the drawing board to modify or eliminate
the bills’ most controversial provisions.197
The Senate continued its work on patent reform during the 111th
Congress (2009-10), but it would take until September 2011 for the AIA to
finally pass. During that time, the banks’ lobbyists continued to pressure
Congress.198 At a hearing before the House Subcommittee on Intellectual
Property, for example, a representative of the Financial Services
Roundtable stated:
[G]iven the importance of the financial services sector to the
[n]ation’s economy and infrastructure, it’s important that the
patent system work for everyone, and currently, it does not. So
191. The American Bankers Association and Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association also lobbied on the banks’ behalf. Lerer, supra note 189, at 1.
192. Matal Part I, supra note 186, at 439.
193. Id.; Stephen T. Schreiner & Karen Axt, Why Banks are Now Implementing Patent
Programs and How Patent Legislative Reforms Will Affect Banks, 124 BANKING L.J. 724,
730 (2007) (noting the banks’ support for post-grant review of patents).
194. Press Release, Coalition for Patent Fairness Supports Introduction of Bipartisan,
Bicameral Patent Reform Bills (Apr. 18, 2007), available at
http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/coalition-for-patent-fairness-supports-introduction-of-bipartisan-bicameral-patentreform-bills-58578362.html. The Coalition for Patent Fairness is a diverse group of
companies supporting patent reform that included, among others, Apple, Intel, Microsoft,
Visa, and the Financial Services Roundtable back in 2007. Id.
195. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 101 (2009).
196. Id.
197. Matal Part I, supra note 186, at 441-42.
198. Letter from the Coalition of Patent Fairness to The Honorable Harry Reid, Majority
Leader, U.S. Senate, and The Honorable Mitch McConnell, Republican Leader, U.S. Senate,
Jan. 22, 2008, http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/comment_letters/61653310.pdf. Signatories
to the letter included Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan, Wells Fargo, and many other
financial institutions. Id.
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instead, the confluence of inoperability, forum shopping, and a
lack of quality prior art, particularly in the area of business
method patents, has conspired to leave financial firms, from the
smallest community banks or local credit union or insurance
agent to the largest global company, mired in . . . meritless
litigation over patents of dubious quality.199
Moreover, citing Lerner’s studies, the banks claimed that reform is
particularly critical for the financial industry because financial patents are
27 times more likely to be asserted in litigation than non-financial
patents.200
In March 2011, the banks got what they wanted. The Senate adopted
an amendment to the reform bill, including a provision sponsored by
Senators Schumer and Kyl that established a new post-issuance review
procedure exclusively for financial business method patents.201 This
provision, which ultimately became section 18 of the AIA, has proven quite
controversial.
B. Section 18 of the AIA and Covered Business Method Patents
Section 18 of the AIA establishes an administrative post-grant review
proceeding for “covered business method” or “CBM” patents, meaning
patents related to financial products.202 According to the legislative history,
this proceeding will “offer a relatively cheap alternative to civil litigation
for challenging these patents,” and will ease the burden on federal courts
“dealing with the backwash of invalid business-method patents.”203 When
considered alone this provision seems perfectly reasonable. Therefore, to
199. America Invents Act: Hearing on H.R. 1249 Before the H. Subcomm. on
Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet of the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. 3 (2011) (Statement of Steve Bartlett for the Financial Services Roundtable).
200. Schreiner & Axt, supra note 193, at 732 (summarizing the testimony of Tony
Squires of Goldman Sachs).
201. Matal Part I, supra note 186, at 445; Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History
of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 626-642 (2012) [hereinafter
“Matal Part II”].
202. Specifically, the Act defines “covered business method patent” as “a patent that
claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other
operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or
service, except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.” 35
U.S.C. § 321. The legislative history reveals the direct connection between this provision of
the Act and the banking industry. The legislative history explains that covered business
method patents are intended to encompass patents “claiming activities that are financial in
nature, incidental to financial activity or complementary to a financial activity.” 157 Cong.
Rec. S5432 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer). This language, i.e.,
“financial in nature” etc., is derived from the provisions of federal banking statutes which
limit banks’ activities to those that are “financial in nature” etc. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k).
203. 157 CONG. REC. S1367 (Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
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understand the controversy surrounding section 18, it is necessary to look
at the other post-grant review proceedings created by the AIA.
In addition to CBM, Congress created two other new administrative
proceedings for challenging patents at the PTO: Inter Partes Review
(“IPR”) and Post-Grant Review (“PGR”).204 With few exceptions, IPR
allows any patent to be challenged at any time after issuance.205 But IPR is
limited in scope in that a petitioner may only raise questions of novelty and
non-obviousness based on patents and printed publications.206 PGR, on the
other hand, is broad in scope, as it allows challenges on any ground
“relating to the invalidity of the patent,” including prior use and § 101
subject matter eligibility.207 However, PGR is available only for patents
filed under the first-to-file system and, even as to those patents, the window
to initiate a PGR remains open just for nine months after issuance.208 Thus,
while these proceedings will no doubt prove useful, each has significant
constraints that may impede effectiveness.
Yet, there are far fewer constraints with respect to the CBM
proceedings, leading some (including the former Chief Judge of the Federal
Circuit) to conclude that section 18 is nothing more than a “bail out” for the
banks.209 Specifically, section 18 permits parties accused of infringement
to challenge any CBM (not just first-to-file patents as with PGR) on any
validity ground (not just novelty and non-obviousness as with IPR).210
Although section 18 was added to the Senate’s version of the reform bill

204. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311, 321 (2011).
205. IPR may only be initiated within twelve months of being served with an
infringement complaint, and parties who have filed declaratory judgment actions are barred
from seeking IPR. 35 U.S.C. § 315.
206. Id. § 312.
207. Id. § 321; Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron
Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1993 (2013).
208. 35 U.S.C. § 321.
209. The Honorable Paul Michel, Rein in the Big Bank Bail-Out, PATENTLY-O (July 7,
2011),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/07/guest-post-rein-in-the-big-bank-bailout.html; Sterne, supra note 140, at 45 (“Section 18 is widely considered to be a ‘bailout’ to
the financial sector”); 157 CONG. REC. S5408 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Cantwell) (condemning section 18 as an “earmark rifleshot” for the banks); see also
Financial Services Group Criticizes Foley & Lardner Attorney Over Patent Reform Issue,
THE
BLT:
THE
BLOG
OF
LEGAL
TIMES
(July
21,
2011),
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2011/07/financial-services-group-criticizes-foley-lardnerattorney-over-patent-reform-issue.html (discussing banks’ criticism of a law firm when one
of its members distributed an email repeating Judge Michel’s criticism of Section 18).
210. 35 U.S.C. § 321. While section 18 currently includes an 8-year sunset provision,
id., legislation has been proposed to eliminate it. See S. 866 (May 6, 2013 113th Cong.);
Tony Dutra, Schumer Seeks Permanent, Expanded CBM PTAB Challenges on Any
Management Patent, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 7,
2013), available at
http://www.bna.com/schumer-seeks-permanent-n17179873837/.
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with little discussion, it was a hotly debated topic in the House.211 To be
sure, Representative Shock offered an amendment striking section 18 from
the bill as an earmark for the banks.212 Those who supported Shock’s
amendment, like Representative Waters, believed section 18 would permit
banks “to steal legally issued and valid patents.”213 Proponents of section
18 responded that the new law would benefit a cross-section of the business
community, not just financial institutions.214
In the end, Shock’s
amendment was voted down 262-158,215 and section 18 became law when
the AIA was passed by Congress and signed by President Obama on
September 16, 2011.216
C. Post-AIA Reactions to Section 18
The financial industry presumably was pleased with the inclusion of
section 18 in the AIA. With all the lobbying efforts and money spent, it
seemed a huge coup for the banks.217 Yet, in the first year after section 18
became effective on September 16, 2012, only about 50 CBM petitions
were filed, as compared to more than 500 IPR petitions filed during the
same time period.218 More to the point, remarkably few proceedings were
initiated by financial institutions. Instead, most of the early section 18
proceedings were brought by a diverse group of petitioners ranging from
Apple and Google to LinkedIn and Liberty Mutual Insurance.219
211. Matal II, supra note 201, at 628-30. More members participated in the debate on
the CBM proceeding than any other provision of the bill. Id. at 629.
212. 157 CONG. REC. H4496 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Shock).
213. Id. at H4496 (statement of Rep. Waters).
214. Id. at H4496 (statement of Rep. Grimm) (including McDonald’s, Wal-Mart, Costco,
Home Depot, Best Buy, and Lowes among the companies that would benefit from § 18).
215. Id. at H4503.
216. 35 U.S.C. § 321.
217. See Lerer, supra note 189, at 1 (stating that banks spent at least $20 million
lobbying for patent reform). But see Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political
Economy of the Patent System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1382 (2009) (finding that the
pharmaceutical, manufacturing, and high tech industries spent more on lobbying for patent
reform than the banks).
218. See Scott A. McKeown, Where are all the Business Method Patent Challenges?,
Patents-Post
Grant
(Apr.
24,
2013),
http://www.patentspostgrant.com/lang/en/2013/04/where-are-all-the-business-methodpatent-challenges. Notably, the PTO’s cumulative statistics indicate that 522 IPR
proceedings and 56 CBM proceedings were filed between September 16, 2012 and
September 27, 2013. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, AIA Statistics (Oct. 30, 2013),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/statistics.jsp.
As indicated in
Appendix A, however, we have identified 50 CBM proceedings during that timeframe
involving different patents, so it’s unclear how the PTO is recording this data.
219. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, AIA Statistics, available at
https://ptabtrials.uspto.gov/prweb/PRWebLDAP2/HcI5xOSeX_yQRYZAnTXXCg%5B%5
B*/!STANDARD?UserIdentifier=searchuser (last visited Dec. 2, 2013).

2014]

BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS

465

That trend appears to be changing, however. As demonstrated in the
chart at Appendix A, sixty-three new CBM petitions were filed between
October 1, 2013 and February 21, 2014. If filings continue at this rate,
approximately four times as many CBM petitions will be filed in fiscal year
2014 (189) as were filed in fiscal year 2013 (44). And it is not only the
overall number of CBM petitions that is increasing, but the number of
financial institutions utilizing these proceedings appears to be on the rise as
well.220 There are potential explanations for this shift in the data.221
Perhaps in the immediate wake of the AIA fewer patent owners asserted
their business method patents for fear of inviting section 18 challenges.
Another possibility is that petitioners initially chose IPR over section 18
proceedings out of concern that the challenged patents would not fall
within the definition of “covered business method.”222 Indeed, early
questions swirled about the proper interpretation of CBM. Although the
PTO issued a rulemaking in August 2012 stating that CBM would be
interpreted broadly so as to include non-financial business method
patents,223 that interpretation quickly became the subject of a lawsuit.224
This uncertainty regarding the scope of section 18 may explain petitioners’
initial reluctance to use the new procedure.
Some recent developments appear to have allayed these concerns,
however, leading to a dramatic increase in the number of CBM petitions
filed in the first two months of the current fiscal year. First, in June 2013,
the White House made various recommendations for improving our patent
system, including expansion of the CBM program “to include a broader
category of computer-enabled patents . . . .”225 Second, in August 2013, the
220. See Appendix A (demonstrating that Bank of America, PNC Bank, US Bancorp,
and Fidelity have all filed filedCBM petitions in the current fiscal year).
221. This data was collected from the USPTO’s PRPS Filing System,
https://ptabtrials.uspto.gov/prweb/PRServlet/oO9O9iMscyJc_fy6LnBDXO9xEtRpDxfL3At
36r8Aw8k%5B*/!STANDARD?. In six instances, matters involving the same parties and
patents are listed as two separate cases by the PTO (CBM2012-00002 and CBM201200004; CBM2012-00010 and CBM2012-00011; CBM2013-00001 and CBM2013-00002;
CBM2013-00003 and CBM2013-00004; CBM2013-00019 and CBM2013-00020;
CBM2013-00021 and CBM2013-00023); CBM2014-00060, CBM2014-00066, and
CBM2014-00067). We have deleted duplicates for simplicity’s sake.
222. Susan Decker, SAP Wins Ruling on Versata Patent in $345 Million Case,
BLOOMBERG (June 12, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-12/sap-winsruling-on-versata-patent-in-345-million-case.html (“People had a misapprehension of how
narrow the definition of covered business method patents is . . . False.”“). Between
September 2012 and May 2013, a total of 260 IPRs have been initiated. See U.S. Patent &
Trademark
Office,
AIA
Statistics
(May
31,
2013),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/statistics.jsp
223. 37 C.F.R. § 42.301.
224. Versata Dev. Grp. Inc. v. Rea, No. 1:13-cv-328(GBL/IDD), 2013 WL 4014649, at
*1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2013).
225. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-
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federal lawsuit challenging the PTO’s interpretation of CBM was dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.226 Finally, as discussed further
below, Congress has proposed multiple bills over the past several months
that would expand the scope of section 18 beyond patents related to
financial products and services.227
At this point, it is still too early to draw any conclusions regarding the
CBM program since the procedures have been in place for less than two
years. What we do know is that CBM, IPR, and PGR have the potential to
profoundly impact our patent system going forward. For example, last
June the PTO issued its first CBM decision in SAP America, Inc. v. Versata
Dev. Grp., Inc. in which the agency struck down all the challenged claims
under section 101.228 This case is being closely watched not only as the
PTO’s first decision in this area, but because it conflicts with a recent
Federal Circuit decision holding that the patent is valid, infringed, and that
the patent owner is entitled to over $300 million in damages.229 Although
the Federal Circuit denied SAP’s motions for stay and rehearing and the
Supreme Court recently denied its petition for certiorari,230 Versata has
appealed the PTO’s decision,231 so this may not be the last we have heard
on this case.232 How the Federal Circuit will resolve this sort of
inconsistency is impossible to predict, and eventually the Supreme Court
may have to weigh in on this and other issues raised by the AIA.233
Tech
Patent
Issues
(June
4,
2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues.
226. Versata Dev. Grp. Inc., 2013 WL 4014649, at *1. The patent owner did, however,
file a notice of appeal to the Federal Circuit on December 2, 2013. Notice of Appeal,
Versata Dev. Grp. Inc., 2013 WL 4014649 (E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2013) (No. 1:13-cv328(GBL/IDD)).
227. See infra note 234 and accompanying text (discussing the Patent Quality
Improvement Act).
228. SAP America, Inc. v. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., Case CBM2012-00001, Final Written
Decision
(PTA
June
11,
2013),
available
at
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/sap_cbm_decision.pdf.
229. Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., 717 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
230. Id.; see SAP America, Inc. v. Versata Software, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/sap-america-inc-v-versata-software-inc/
(last
accessed Feb. 26, 2014) (indicating that the Court denied certiorari on Feb. 21, 2014).
231. . SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata Software, Inc., Brief in Opp., No. 13-716, at 13 (Dec.
2013), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/VersataFinal.pdf.
232. Only time will tell whether the parties will settle in light of the Supreme Court’s
denial of SAP’s certiorari petition or whether the Federal Circuit will end up reviewing the
PTO’s invalidity determination.
233. Compare In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 698 F.3d 1349, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (on petition
for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc) (O’Malley, J., concurring in the denial of
rehearing) (“[A] prior court decision in which a party has failed to prove a patent invalid
does not bar the [. . .PTO] from subsequently reexamining that same patent.”), with In re
Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“No
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In the meantime, the last several months have witnessed a resurgence
of patent reform efforts, including one related directly to section 18. This
past May, Senator Schumer introduced the Patent Quality Improvement
Act (“PQIA”) which would (i) expand the definition of “covered business
methods” so that section 18 is no longer limited to financial patents, and
(ii) eliminate section 18’s sunset provision to make the program
permanent.234 In July, Representative Issa introduced the Stopping the
Offensive Use of Patents Act (“STOP Act”), which is nearly identical to
the PQIA.235 Simply put, these two acts would subject all business method
patents to PTO scrutiny, not just those related to financial products. While
these proposals may seem logical in theory, they are unlikely to gain
momentum given the extreme pressure such an expanded program would
place on the PTO’s already-stretched resources. Moreover, recent
opposition from a coalition that includes major players like IBM,
Microsoft, and 3M makes expansion of the CBM program even more
improbable.236 In fact, the patent reform bill passed by the House last
December—the Innovation Act introduced by Representative Goodlatte—
originally expanded the CBM program,237 but was amended to eliminate
those provisions because of opposition from these powerful software
companies.238
Yet, some of the other current proposals appear to have substantial
support from the banks and other industries.239 First, there has been a lot of
authority, no theory, no law or history, permits administrative nullification of a final judicial
decision . . . . Judicial rulings are not advisory; they are obligatory.”).
234. S. 866 (May 6, 2013 113th Cong.). The proposed bill defines “covered business
method patent” to include a patent that “claims a method or corresponding apparatus for
performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or
management of any enterprise, product, or service, except technological inventions.” S. 866
–
Patent
Quality
Improvement
Act
of
2013,
CONGRESS.GOV,
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/senate-bill/866 (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
235. Stopping the Offensive Use of Patents Act, H.R. 2766, 113th Cong. (2013).
236. Letter to Chairmen Leahy and Goodlatte re: Patent Reform (Sept. 19, 2013),
available
at
http://www.chi.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Cross-Sector-LetterAddressing-Concerns-with-Proposals-to-Expand-PTO-%E2%80%9CCovered-BusinessMethod-Patents%E2%80%9D-Program-Sept.-19-2013.pdf.
237. Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013).
238. Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 3309, Offered by Mr. Goodlatte of
Virgina, Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013). Of course, only time will tell what
will happen in Congress, as Schumer and others still strongly support expansion of the CBM
program. See Timothy B. Lee, Software Patent Reform Just Died in the House, Thanks to
IBM
and
Microsoft,
WASH.
POST.
(Nov.
20,
2013,
10:17
AM)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/20/software-patent-reformjust-died-in-the-house-thanks-to-ibm-and-microsoft/ (quoting Schumer as saying that he
expects the CBM provisions to remain in the Senate legislation even though they were
removed from the House bill).
239. Letter to Majority Leader Reid, Minority Leader McConnell, Speaker Boehner, and
Minority Leader Pelosi re: Patent Reform (July 17, 2013), available at
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discussion recently, including in the popular media,240 about using attorney
fee awards and/or sanctions to ward off patent trolls.241 Second, limitations
on discovery in patent cases have already been implemented in a number of
courts,242 and there are legislative proposals to codify these discovery
restrictions to curb patent litigation abuse.243 And finally, both Congress
and the Executive Branch have taken on the “who owns what patent”
problem,244 which refers to the widespread practice of failing to disclose
patent transfers and other ownership information to the public.245
Sometimes patent owners set up shell companies to hide the identity of the
real party in interest, while other patent owners simply fail to inform the
PTO when the patent changes hands.246 Either way, anonymous patents can
create real problems when it comes to managing, licensing, and litigating
http://www.patentfairness.org/media/press/#2013-07-17-1 [hereinafter July 17 Letter]
(signatories include the American Bankers Association, the Financial Services Roundtable,
and the Independent Community Bankers of America); Tony Dutra, Obama Anti-Patent
Troll Announcement Hists a Nerve in U.S. Business Community, BNA’S PATENT,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Vol. 86, No. 2117, at 281 (June 7, 2013) (stating that the
American Bankers Association has been active in the current patent reform debate).
240. See, e.g., Randall R. Rader, Colleen V. Chien & David Hricik, Make Patent Trolls
Pay
in
Court,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
4,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/make-patent-trolls-pay-in-court.html?_r=0
(explaining the problematic behavior of patent trolls and the legal tools that should be used
to combat this behavior).
241. See, e.g., Innovation Act (H.R. 3309) (providing that the prevailing party in a patent
suit should usually be awarded attorneys’ fees and other costs); Patent Abuse Reduction Act
of 2013 (S. 1013) (awarding attorney’s fees in patent cases to the prevailing party except in
certain cases); Patent Litigation Integrity Act of 2013 (S. 1612) (same).
242. See, e.g., The Honorable Leonard Davis, In the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas General Order 12-6, (Feb. 27, 2012) (adopting a new model order
to limit discovery in patent cases); DCG Sys., Inc. v. Checkpoint Techs., LLC, No. 5:11-cv03792-PSG, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (adopting a version of the “Model Order on E-Discovery
in Patent Cases” that limits the scope of electronic discovery).
243. See, e.g., Patent Litigation and Innovation Act (H.R. 2639) (staying discovery in
patent cases until certain motions are resolved); Patent Abuse Reduction Act, supra note
241 (limiting the scope of discovery, sequencing discovery, and imposing cost shifting for
the discovery of “non-core” documentary evidence).
244. Colleen V. Chien, The Who Owns What Problem in Patent Law (Jan. 30, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1995664 [hereinafter Chien, Who Owns What].
245. See, e.g., End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024 (requiring names of patent
owners and real parties in interest to be disclosed to PTO); Patent Abuse Reduction Act of
2013, S. 1013 (proposing that patent complaints must include “the identity of any person
with a direct financial interest in the outcome of the action”); The White House Task Force
on High-Tech Patent Issues, Legislative Priorities & Executive Actions (June 4, 2013)
(requiring patentees and applicants to disclose the “real party-in-interest” to the PTO).
More recently, the PTO put out for notice and comment rules requiring patent applicants
and owners to regularly update ownership information. See Attributable Ownership,
USPTO,
last
visited
Feb.
26,
2014,
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/attributable_ownership.jsp.
246. See Chien, Who Owns What, supra note 244, at 3-4.
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patents.
Whatever the outcome of these various reform efforts, the message
has been consistent: our patent system remains broken. Nevertheless, the
number of patent applications filed and patents issued by the PTO
continues to rise each year, even for business method patents.247 The fact is
that many of the same financial firms that pled with Congress to fix
business method patents are building their own patent portfolios.
Questions about what the banks are patenting and why it matters are
explored next.
V.

THE PATENT PORTFOLIOS OF BIG BANKS

In the current environment, it is commonplace for financial
institutions of all sizes to own patents. For purposes of this Article,
however, we focused our research on large financial institutions for several
reasons. First, to the extent that the patent process involves a significant
investment of resources, one would expect that larger institutions would be
more likely to have significant patent activity.248 Second, large institutions
are often industry leaders. Therefore, if there has been a change in attitude
toward the benefits of patents in the financial services industry, one might
expect to see a change in larger financial institutions before smaller ones.249
Finally, and most generally, the political and economic power of large
financial institutions means that their interest in patents may have a
significant impact on patent practice and policy.250
247. In 2012, there were 542,815 utility patent applications filed compared to 503,582 in
2011 and 490,226 in 2010. As for patent grants, the total for utility patents was 253,155 in
2012 compared to 224,505 in 2011 and 219,614 in 2010. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
U.S.
Patent
Statistics,
Calendar
Years
1963-2012,
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf. In 2012, 4,854 class 705
patents were granted compared to 4,064 in 2011 and 4,059 in 2010. See U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics, Patent Counts by Class by Year, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.pdf.
248. Innovation, in general, is expensive. Early studies by Peter Tufano estimated that
the costs of developing a new financial product range from $50,000 to $5 million. Peter
Tufano, Financial Innovation and First-Mover Advantages, 25 J. OF FIN. ECON. 213, 213-40
(1989).
249. Consistent with this observation, Tufano found that the large financial institutions
were the primary innovators. Id. at 219. Outside of financial services, larger firms spend
more on research and development than smaller ones. Michael Mandel, Scale and
Innovation in Today’s Economy, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE POLICY MEMO (December
2011)
at
3–4,
available
at
http://progressivepolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/12.2011-Mandel_Scale-and-Innovation-in-Todays-Economy.pdf.
Whether that means more generally that larger firms innovate more than smaller firms is not
as clear. Id. at 2.
250. Although our study focuses on big banks, we recognize the unique value that
patents could provide to smaller financial institutions, especially in the effort to raise capital
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Specifically, we examined the patent activity of U.S. banks that are
global systemically important banks (“G-SIFIs”). G-SIFIs are institutions
that have been identified by the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”)251 as
requiring special supervision because their size, complexity, and systemic
interconnectedness make these institutions especially important to the
world financial system and economy.252 While the patent activities of such
institutions are not important to their supervision, we chose the G-SIFI
status as a proxy for institutions with the most political and economic
power. Since November of 2011, the FSB has identified, annually, the
banks that meet the G-SIFI criteria. The following U.S. banks are included
(in alphabetical order): Bank of America (“BOA”); Bank of New York
Mellon; Citigroup;253 Goldman Sachs; JP Morgan Chase (“JP Morgan”);
Morgan Stanley;254 State Street; and Wells Fargo. The discussion below
focuses on the recent patent activity of those eight banks.
A. Patent Activity of Big Banks
Companies acquire patents—or build patent portfolios—in different
ways. Companies patent their own inventions, meaning the company’s
employees file patent applications for “on the job” inventions, and then
assign any issued patents to the company as required by their employment

and attract business. See, e.g., Amelia S. Rinehart, Patents as Escalators, 14 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 81, 111 (2011) (arguing that patents are particularly important for start-up
companies that need to raise capital, but lack other measurable values of success); Clarisa
Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 653 (2002) (“Among venture capitalists, both
the quantity and quality of patents have long been factors that are taken into consideration
when deciding whether to invest in a company, particularly in its early stages.”).
251. “The FSB, originally the Financial Stability Forum, was established in 1999. The
FSB was established to coordinate at the international level the work of national financial
authorities and international standard setting bodies and to develop and promote the
implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies. It
brings together national authorities responsible for financial stability in significant
international financial centres, international financial institutions, sector-specific
international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of central bank
experts.”
Overview, FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD,
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/overview.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
252. Specifically, the FSB states: “SIFIs are financial institutions whose distress or
disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would
cause significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity.” FSB,
Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions, 1 (Nov. 4, 2011),
available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf.
253. In considering patent grants, Citigroup includes Citigroup, N.A., Citicorp
Development Center, Inc., Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., and Citicorp Credit Services, Inc.
254. In considering patent grants, Morgan Stanley includes Morgan Stanley, Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter & Co., and Morgan Stanley Capital International, Inc.
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contracts.255 Information about these types of patent transactions is widely
available because the PTO maintains records of the names of the inventors,
as well as the names of the individuals or entities to whom ownership of
the patent was assigned at the time the patent was issued.256
Portfolios are also built by purchasing patent rights from other firms.
Although patents have always been bought and sold, the practice has
become ubiquitous in recent years.257 Some patent transfers have even
garnered the attention of the mainstream media, such as Kodak’s 2012 sale
of its portfolio to Apple, Google, Facebook, and others for $525 million.258
Aside from the rare high-profile transaction, however, publicly available
data about patent transfers is scarce. Patent owners are not required to
notify the PTO when patents change hands,259 nor are firms usually
compelled to disclose their financial interests in patents. As noted earlier,
proposals to remedy this information deficit are currently on the table, but
for the moment the “who owns what patent” problem persists.260
Consequently, our ability to evaluate the patent activity of big banks suffers
from these limitations.261
Still, even given these constraints, the data tell an interesting story
about patents and the financial industry—namely, that G-SIFIs have been
patenting many of their own inventions in recent years. Looking first at
utility patents generally, the PTO has issued an annual report for almost
two decades (1995-2012) that lists in descending order the organizations
that received forty or more patents during a given calendar year.262 From
1995 to 2007, none of the G-SIFIs appeared on this list.263 That trend
began to shift in 2008 when JP Morgan was issued forty-seven patents; JP
255. See generally Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 42, at 86-87.
256. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image Database,
Tips on Field Searching, available at
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/help/helpflds.htm#Assignee_Name.
257. See Chien, Who Owns What, supra note 244 at 2 (reporting that patent transfers
have grown from less than 2,000 in 1980 to almost 90,000 by 2003).
258. See Andrew Martin, Kodak to Sell Digital Imaging Patents for $525 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2012, at B3 (reporting on Kodak’s announcement of its sale of 1,100 digital
imaging patents to a “consortium that includes many of the world’s biggest technology
firms”).
259. Chien, Who Owns What, supra note 244, at 2-3.
260. See supra notes 244, 245 (discussing proposals to curb “anonymous patents”).
261. With regard to the activities of banks in particular, one might expect to see banks
taking a security interest in patents as collateral for loans. A security interest in a patent,
however, is perfected through compliance with state law Uniform Commercial Code filing
systems. Security interests are not recorded with the PTO. In re Cybernectic Servs., Inc.,
252 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2001).
262. The threshold number was thirty until 1998 when it was increased to forty.
263. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Reports By Patenting Organization, Final
Tabulation - Patenting by Organizations Report, Single Year Reports, 1995 to Present,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports_topo.htm.
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Morgan has remained on the list for the past four years with its highest
number of patent grants (eighty-four) in 2010.264 The other G-SIFIs with
substantial patenting activity include BOA, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman
Sachs. BOA received seventy-three patents in 2011 and 165 patents in
2012, while Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs have each only appeared
on the list once since 2008.265
To understand the significance of these figures, it helps to put them in
perspective. In 2012, the two organizations issued the greatest number of
patents were International Business Machines Corporation (“IBM”) and
Samsung Electronics Co. (“Samsung”). That year, IBM and Samsung
received 6,457 and 5,043 patents, respectively, far outpacing the other
leading patenting organizations. Indeed, only twenty-six other entities
were granted more than 1,000 patents in 2012, most of which are in the
high tech sector.266 Thus, while the G-SIFIs’ total patents are low
compared to the high tech giants, their numbers resemble those of firms in
more traditional patenting industries. In 2012, for example, the PTO issued
BOA 165 patents, and issued a similar number to Stanford University
(182), Advanced Micro Devices (178), and the U.S. Army (172).
Likewise, when JP Morgan received eighty-four patents in 2010, it was not
far behind entities with longstanding patent practices like Konica Minolta
(87) and Whirlpool Corporation (86).267
Perhaps even more telling about this surge in financial industry
patenting are the data regarding Class 705 patents. The PTO reports on the
patents in certain technology classes with a breakdown by organization.
The report for Class 705 provides patent count numbers from 1969 to
2012.268 Before 2006, the only G-SIFI with any substantial Class 705
patenting activity was Citigroup.269 That started to change in the mid2000s, however, as illustrated in the table below.

264. Id. JP Morgan was issued forty-two, sixty, and seventy-three utility patents in
2009, 2011, and 2012, respectively. Id.
265. Id. Morgan Stanley was issued forty-six utility patents in 2010 and Goldman Sachs
was issued forty utility patents in 2012. Id.
266. Id. These companies include, inter alia, Sony, Panasonic, Microsoft, Google, and
Apple.
267. Id. Minolta and Whirlpool have appeared on the list consistently since 1995.
268. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Statistics, Class 705, Breakout by
Organization,
supra
note
104,
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasga/705_torg.htm.
269. From 1969-2005, the PTO issued Citibank and affiliated entities fifty-nine Class
705 patents. See supra note 247. During that same time period, the other G-SIFIs received a
total of eight Class 705 patents broken down as follows: BOA (one); JP Morgan (one);
Wells Fargo (zero); Goldman Sachs (four); State Street (zero); Morgan Stanley (two); Bank
of NY Mellon (zero). Id.
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As the table reflects, all of the G-SIFIs except State Street have
increased their Class 705 patenting over the past six years. Of the 320
firms listed in the Class 705 report, IBM was the organization granted the
most patents between 1969 and 2012 with 1,402. While none of the GSIFIs are in IBM’s league, some of them are real contenders in the world of
business method patents. JP Morgan has 238 Class 705 patents, ranking
9th overall; BOA has 133 Class 705 patents, ranking 21st overall; and
Goldman Sachs has 130 Class 705 patents ranking 22nd overall.270 This is
particularly remarkable given that these three banks had so few Class 705
patents before 2006.271 In other words, this rapid rise in the ranks is based
exclusively on the banks’ patenting activity over the past six years.
Moreover, most of the G-SIFIs have continued their patenting
efforts even after the AIA. The most extreme example is BOA, which has
filed at least seventy Class 705 patent applications since September 2011.272
But Goldman, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo have also
pursued business method patents in the post-AIA era.273 We cannot
270. Morgan Stanley and Citigroup would have ranked higher if the patents owned by
their affiliates were consolidated.
271. See supra note 265 (discussing G-SIFIs’ patenting activity before 2006).
272. We gathered this data from the PTO database on patent applications available here:
http://appft1.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.html. The search terms used for BOA
were [an/”Bank of America” and ccl/705/$; for Goldman [an/”Goldman Sachs” and
ccl/705/$; for JP Morgan [an/”JP Morgan” and ccl/705/$; for Morgan Stanley [an/Stanley
and ccl/705/$; and for Wells Fargo [an/”Wells Fargo” and ccl/705/$. From this list, we
identified those application filed after September 16, 2011—the date the AIA was enacted.
Similar searches were run for Citigroup, NY Mellon, and State Street, but no Class 705
post-AIA patent applications were found.
273. Id.
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determine the exact number of pending patent applications submitted by
banks because such information is not generally published until eighteen
months after filing.274 But the fact that banks are continuing to patent at all
raises questions about what the future holds.275
B. Character of Big Bank Patents
Clearly, big banks are patenting more now than ever before, but the
nature of those patents is difficult to measure. We do not offer an empirical
characterization of G-SIFIs’ patent holdings or activities. Such a study is
beyond the scope of this project.276 Instead, we offer some general
observations regarding recent patent activity that may be worthy of future
study. As discussed in Part I, financial innovations can be categorized into
the following groups: new products or services; new processes or
procedures; and new organizations.277 The following discussion includes
observations of big banks’ business method patents for each of those
groups.278
Not surprisingly, many Class 705 patents relate to traditional
banking products and services, i.e., lending and deposit taking. BOA holds
patents for “evaluating customers’ ability to manage revolving credit”279

274. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2006).
275. See Vanessa Kortekaas, Financial Services Patents Hit Seven-Year Low, FINANCIAL
TIMES
(June
2,
2013),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/51fe3f9c-cb65-11e2-8ff300144feab7de.html (stating that, although the number of financial patent applications is
down, there were still 3,500 financial services patent applications filed worldwide in 2012).
276. Duffy and Squires studied 100 recent 705/35 patents. Based on that data, Duffy and
Squires offer two observations. First, a significant number of patents in that group had little
to do with finance. Second, even among the patents that had a connection to finance “very
few even purported to disclose the type of cutting edge financial engineering in valuation or
product and market design that would be cognizable as a significant development in
financial theory (with significance judged by the standards that would be applied in business
schools or economics departments).” Duffy & Squires, supra note 47, at 26.
277. As discussed in Part I, financial innovation can also be categorized according to
function. Both types of categorizations present difficulties in application in the context of
reviewing patents. We found that the new products/processes/organizations categorization
presented relatively fewer difficulties.
278. These categories are overlapping. For example, many new processes and
procedures relate directly to new products. Similarly, many new business structures offer
new products. See Tufano, supra note 22 at 4-5 (“The[se] ‘innovations’ are sometimes
divided into product or process innovation . . . . . .[i]n practice, even this innocuous
differentiation is not clear, as process and product innovation is often linked.”). Despite this
obvious overlap, we think these categories are a useful mechanism for organizing our
discussion of big banks’ patents.
279. U.S. Patent No. 8,078,529 (filed May 28, 2009). Revolving credit includes credit
cards. This patent involves the aggregation of certain types of spending behavior by
customers utilizing revolving credit.
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and an “automated teller machine transaction queue.”280 Wells Fargo holds
a patent for a “system and method for MICR-based duplicate detection and
management.”281 While many patents that relate to traditional banking
activities do not, on their face, appear especially innovative, some do. For
example, BOA owns a patent for a process that measures the
“physiological response of a customer during financial activity.”282 This
innovation recognizes that while technological advances allow consumers
to pay for their purchases with great ease, such convenience may lead to
overspending or other undesirable financial transaction behavior. This
technology would, among other things, provide a customer with an alert if
conditions were present (e.g., elevated heart rate) that would likely produce
an unfavorable financial transaction.283
Big banks’ Class 705 patents also include those relevant to modern,
complex financial products. Citibank, for instance, holds a patent for a
“system and method for creating and managing a synthetic currency.”284
Goldman Sachs owns a patent for a “system and method for creating,
managing and trading hedge portfolios.”285 Bank of New York Mellon
owns a patent for a “method and system for securitizing a currency related
commodity.”286
Big banks also hold patents relevant to new processes and
procedures. Several Class 705 patents relate to internal compliance or risk
management. In fact, we found a surprising number of big bank patents
that included “risk management” in the title: twenty-one held by Goldman
Sachs;287 two by BOA;288 and three by JP Morgan.289 Both Morgan Stanley

280. U.S. Patent No. 8,260,707 (filed July 15, 2008). This patent covers a process by
which a customer can initiate a banking transaction from a networked device, e.g., a
personal computer. The transaction is then stored and available for completion by the
customer at an ATM location.
281. U.S. Patent No. 8,060,442 (filed Apr. 21, 2008). MICR is an acronym for magnetic
ink character recognition and refers to the string of characters printed at the bottom of a
check. This patent is for a process of detecting the presentation of duplicate checks.
282. U.S. Patent No. 8,417,584 (filed July 29, 2010).
283. Id.
284. U.S. Patent No. 6,188,993 (filed Apr. 11, 1997). The patent description explains
that “[s]ynthetic currency is created by pooling and dividing into shares a portfolio of highly
liquid assets and frequent evaluation and disbursements of dividends on those assets so as to
hold the value of the synthetic currency share at unity with the underlying currency.” Id.
285. U.S. Patent No. 7,885,885 (filed Aug. 15, 2007). This patent “discloses
apparatuses, systems and methods for providing optimal hedge portfolios that minimize
single stock idiosyncratic risk for a given level of transactional costs.” Id.
286. U.S. Patent No. 8,332,292 (filed Sept. 28, 2005).
287. U.S Patent Nos. 8,311,933 (filed Oct. 19, 2011); 8,266,051 (filed Jan. 15, 2010);
8,099,357 (filed Feb. 2, 2010); 8,086,617 (filed May 21, 2010); 8,285,615 (filed May 11,
2009); 8,024,251 (filed Sept. 10, 2008); 7,711,637 (filed Feb. 7, 2007); 8,209,246 (filed
June 18, 2003); 8,140,415 (filed Mar. 20, 2001); 8,126,800 (filed Mar. 15, 2004); 7,752,227
(filed Mar. 15, 2004); 8,069,105 (filed June 17, 2003); 7,979,347 (filed Nov. 16, 2000);
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and the Bank of New York Mellon hold patents involving VaR,290 the
popular risk management tool discussed in Part I.
Other big bank patents cover some of the newer business structures
also discussed in Part I, such as Internet banks and special purpose
vehicles. Several big bank patents support Internet banking operations.291
Both Bank of New York Mellon and JP Morgan own patents creating
systems that rely on special purpose vehicles or similar structures.292 Given
the attractiveness of banks to the sensibilities of wrongdoers, it is not
surprising that banks hold patents related to fraud and crime prevention.293
By way of example, BOA holds a patent for a “fraudulent transaction
identification system”294 and one for a “method and system to evaluate antimoney laundering risk.”295
Finally, while our study is focused on business method patents, we
note that banks also hold more conventional patents that have nothing to do
with the business of banking in particular or business methods generally.
BOA owns a patent for video game technology,296 several patents on a light
fixture,297 and a patent on a golf ball.298 JP Morgan owns a patent for an
“active night vision image intensity balancing system.” 299 These non7,904,361 (filed June 18, 2003); 7,676,426 (filed June 19, 2003); 8,121,937 (filed July 24,
2003); 7,548,883 (filed Aug. 1, 2003); 7,529,702 (filed Dec. 8, 2003); 7,181,428 (filed Jan.
30, 2001); 7,024,383 (filed Mar. 16, 2000); 6,829,590 (filed Oct. 31, 2000).
288. U.S. Patent No. 7,630,934 (filed Feb. 20, 2008); 7,496,964 (filed Nov. 23, 2004).
289. U.S. Patent No. 8,311,922 (filed Oct. 13, 2010); 7,890,343 (filed Jan. 11, 2005);
7,840,468 (filed Mar. 2, 2007).
290. U.S. Patent No. 8,234,201 (filed Mar. 20, 2009) (“system and method for
determining a liquidity-adjusted value at risk (LA-Var)” held by Morgan Stanley); U.S.
Patent No. 8,275,686 (filed July 24, 2008) (“methods for measuring hedging value-at-risk
and profitability” held by Bank of New York Mellon).
291. U.S. Patent No. 8,458,070 (filed June 15, 2012) (held by JP Morgan Chase); U.S.
Patent No. 7,971,059 (filed June 28, 2011) (held by Bank of America); U.S. Patent No.
7,865,605 (filed June 16, 2008) (held by Citibank).
292. U.S. Patent No. 8,326,720 (filed Aug. 4, 2012) (“systems and methods for
securitizing a commodity” owned by Bank of New York Mellon); U.S. Patent No.
8,374,938 (filed Mar. 26, 2010) (“system and method for managing hedging of longevity
risk” owned by JP Morgan Chase); U.S. Patent No. 8,332,292 (filed Sept. 28, 2005)
(“method and system for securitizing a currency related commodity” owned by Bank of
New York Mellon).
293. According to the PTO, Jacob Perkins was granted the first patent in financial
services for an invention for “Detecting Counterfeit Notes.” USPTO White Paper, supra
note 57, at 2.
294. U.S. Patent No. 8,103,568 (filed Oct. 15, 2008).
295. U.S. Patent No. 8,412,601 (filed Sept. 30, 2004).
296. U.S. Patent No. 8,251,815 (filed June 19, 2008).
297. U.S. Design Patent Nos. D601,297 (filed May 6, 2009) and D601,296 (filed May 6,
2009).
298. U.S. Patent No. 6,482,109 (filed Nov. 29, 2000).
299. U.S. Patent No. 7,646,884 (filed Jan. 12, 2008). This patent relates to night vision
system for a vehicle. The Ford Motor Company is also an assignee on this patent.
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financial patents raise interesting legal questions. Under federal law,
“financial holding compan[ies]”300 are permitted to engage only in activities
that are “financial in nature or incidental to such financial activity” or, in
some instances, activities that are “complementary to a financial
activity.”301 All of the G-SIFIs are financial holding companies302 and are,
therefore, subject to this activity restriction. While we defer analysis of
this question to future study, as an initial matter we find it hard to imagine
that patenting a video game is “financial in nature,” “incidental to such
financial activity,” or even “complementary to a financial activity.”303 Golf
balls, on the other hand, are clearly essential to banking.304
C. Why Are Big Banks Patenting?
Entities are motivated to patent their inventions for various
reasons. Some of the most common explanations are that patents help
commercialize inventions, provide a return on investment, and prevent
competitors from free-riding.305 Even while banks may be engaging in this
traditional calculus, we consider additional explanations for the recent
higher rates of patenting by big banks.
An obvious explanation is that banks increased their patenting
activity once State Street made clear that business methods were
patentable. If it were that simple, however, one would expect to see a
significant rise in the number of Class 705 patents issued to G-SIFIs in the
few years post-State Street, but this is not the case.306 Instead, the surge in
bank patents did not materialize until a decade after the Federal Circuit
decided State Street.
Another possibility is that G-SIFIs started patenting defensively
when others sued or threatened to sue for patent infringement. The purpose
of defensive patenting is three-fold: (1) to prevent others from patenting an

300. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(p) (2006).
301. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1); Saule T. Omarova, Merchants of Wall Street: Banking,
Commerce and Commodities, 98 MINN. L.R. 1178 (2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2180647; Saule T. Omarova & M. Tahyar, That Which We Call a
Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company Regulation in the United States, 31
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 113 (2011).
302. For a current list of all financial holding companies, see Bd. of Gov. of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Financial Holding Companies (Oct. 8, 2013),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/fhc.htm.
303. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (2006).
304. That BOA owns a patent on a golf ball is somewhat amusing. In the traditional 3-63 model of commercial banking, bankers paid 3% on deposits; charged 6% interest on loans;
and were on the golf course by 3:00. Over the last forty years, the 3-6-3 model has become
less reality and more old joke. See Schooner & Taylor, supra note 32, at 7-11.
305. Merges, Mennell & Lemley, supra note 42, at 125-34.
306. See USPTO Statistics, supra note 104.
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invention; (2) to discourage patent suits with the threat of a counterclaim;
and (3) to create prior art that can be used to invalidate asserted patents.307
Ideally, defensive patents avoid litigation and force competitors to enter
into cross-licenses since each party owns patents covering the others’
products.308 Of course, defensive patenting works best against competitors,
as opposed to PAEs, because PAEs do not manufacture products and
cannot be countersued for infringement.309 Perhaps this explains why the
big banks have not sued each other for patent infringement, but instead
have been targeted by PAEs.310
Alternatively, the G-SIFIs may be patenting their inventions in
order to sell those patent rights to others. As discussed earlier, a substantial
marketplace has developed for patents in recent years, so it is possible that
banks are acquiring patents and then selling them to PAEs to enforce or
exploit as they see fit.311 Unfortunately, little public information exists
regarding these sorts of transactions. Therefore, it is not possible to know
for certain what banks are doing with their patents post issuance. Yet,
given how common this transfer practice has become in the high tech
industry,312 it seems fair to speculate that banks are engaged in it as well.
Banks could also be holding onto their patents and licensing them
to practicing companies as a revenue source. Many companies, IBM being
a prime example, license (rather than practice) a substantial portion of their
patent portfolios.313 Like patent transfers, however, the publicly available
information regarding patent licenses is extremely limited.314 One way
patent licenses come to light is through litigation, but so far big banks have
not sought to enforce their patents in court. That could change, however,
as the patent landscape continues to evolve and banks build bigger and
stronger patent arsenals.

307. Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 299-301
(2010) [hereinafter Chien, From Arms Race]
308. Id. at 307-10.
309. Id.
310. See id. (arguing that defensive patenting has reduced the number of competitor suits
in the high tech arena); see also supra Part III (discussing patent litigation against the
banking industry).
311. Chien, From Arms Race, supra note 307, at 301.
312. Id. at 300-01.
313. See, e.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, The History of Intellectual
Property Taxation: Promoting Innovation and Other Intellectual Property Goals?, 64 SMU
L. REV. 795, 848 (2011) (“Texas Instruments and IBM changed their core businesses,
moved away from manufacturing products, and embraced a licensing model that allowed
them to capitalize on their strengths based on powerful patent portfolios.”).
314. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 2021-23 (2007).
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Finally, we do not doubt that some part of the increasing interest in
patenting by big banks is a result of law firm marketing. 315 Changes in law
provide opportunities for lawyers to market their services. Certainly, State
Street and its progeny have given law firms the basis for selling patent
expertise beyond the more typical client base of manufacturing,
pharmaceutical, and biotechnology firms. Many bank managers or even inhouse counsel may simply have not had patents on their radars in the past,
but have responded favorably to the suggestion that patent protection be
added to their repertoire for protecting intellectual property.
VI.

IMPLICATIONS OF BANK PARTICIPATION IN THE PATENT
SYSTEM

While the banking industry and the patent system have co-existed
in this country for centuries,316 only recently have these two institutions
begun to intersect. In this final Part, we consider potential implications of
big banks participating in our patent system, both as advocates for patent
reform and as patent owners themselves.
A. The Banks as Patent Reformers
For almost a decade now, patent reform has been a hot topic on
Capitol Hill. During the initial phase of the patent reform effort, which
began around 2005 and culminated in the passage of the AIA in 2011, the
banks played a prominent role, despite being relative newcomers to the
patent arena.317 The banks aligned themselves with high tech/software
companies and together they lobbied Congress for various changes to the
patent system—changes that, for the most part, would weaken patent
owners’ rights vis à vis alleged infringers.318
Importantly, these

315. See, e.g., NovusIP, LLC Website, Financial Patents, available at
http://www.novusip.com/Practice-Areas/Financial-Patents.shtml (last visited Nov. 20, 2013)
(offering legal services related to patent protection); Chapman & Cutler LLP Website,
Patent
Procurement,
available
at
http://www.chapman.com/practices-PatentProcurement.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2013) (offering legal services for the procurement
and enforcement of patents).
316. See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492-1900) 88-89 (M.E. Sharpe Books
88-89 2002) (discussing at length the development of the United States banking system
while mentioning the existence of patents); Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and
Manufacturing in the Early Republic, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 855 (1998)
(discussing the initial interpretations and purposes of the U.S. patent system).
317. See supra Part IV.A (recounting the banks’ evolving role in patent reform).
318. Id.; see also William C. Rooklidge, Reform of the Patent Laws: Forging Legislation
Addressing Disparate Interests, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 9, 13-16 (2006)
(discussing how proposals for limits on injunctive relief and damages could “alter the
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recommendations were met with resistance from a separate powerful
coalition consisting of pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms who
advocated for a first-to-file system, elimination of the inequitable conduct
defense, and other measures to protect patent owners.319
Still, the banks emerged as clear winners in this first round of
reform, securing broad rights to challenge financial patents at the PTO
under section 18 of the AIA.320 When section 18 was first proposed,
commentators pondered why banks should get such a “sweet deal,”321 and
high-profile figures in the patent community, including the former Chief
Judge of the Federal Circuit, called it a blatant “bail out” for a favored
constituency.322 Despite the opposition and criticism, section 18 became
law—a testament to the strength of the bank lobby. Indeed, banks have
been called the most powerful lobby in Congress today.323
It is precisely because of this influence that we believe the banks’
participation in the current patent reform effort is worthy of close attention.
As Kesan and Gallo have observed, “The design of a patent system, like
any other formal institution, depends not only on objective technical or
scientific characteristics that will promote optimal efficiency, but also on
the political preferences of the economic actors with a stake in the matter to
be regulated.”324 The most recent patent reform measures,325 which are
primarily aimed at curbing PAE or troll activity, are supported by the high
tech and banking industries,326 as well as a number of retailers, restaurants,
balance of rights between patent owners and accused infringers”).
319. Eric E. Williams, Patent Reform: The Pharmaceutical Industry Prescription for
Post-Grant Opposition and Remedies, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 354 (2008).
320. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the AIA and the big banks’ role in this legislative
reform effort).
321. Janie Lorber, Patent Carve-Out Finds Opponents Left and Right, ROLL CALL (June
15, 2011, 12:00_AM), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/56_139/patent-reform-bill-2064751.html.
322. Michel, supra note 16 (criticizing section 18 and arguing that Congress should
remove it from the patent reform bill).
323. See, e.g., Interview by Ray Hanania with Richard Durbin, U.S. Senator, Ill., on
Radio Chicagoland (WJJG 1530 AM radio broadcast Apr. 27, 2009), available at
http://www.progressillinois.com/sites/progressillinois.com/files/durbin-banks.mp3
(explaining that the bank lobby is the most powerful in Congress: “they frankly own the
place.”).
324. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 217, at 1348.
325. See supra Part IV.C (summarizing the legislative, executive, and judicial patent
reform proposals).
326. It is true that the high tech industry is not monolithic in its view on patent policy.
See R. Allison, Abe Dunn & Ronald J. Mann, Software Patents, Incumbents and Entry, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1579, 1621 (2007) (stating that the software industry has diverse perspectives
on patent policy). Indeed, as discussed earlier, several leading software companies like IBM
and Microsoft opposed the expansion of the § 18 CBM program, while others (like Google)
supported it. Yet a substantial number of the industry players support the remaining reform
efforts, which are directed primarily at patent trolls. See About the Coalition, COALITION
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grocery stores, and other small business groups.327 What may be absent
from this wave of reform, however, is the formidable counter-voice that the
pharmaceutical and biotech industries provided Congress during the last
reform effort. Because PAEs don’t usually target and sue pharmaceutical
companies, that industry is less interested in the present debate.328 This
leaves the door open for banks to take on greater significance in shaping
patent law.329
This possibility of increased bank involvement in the patent system
should cause pause. Just a few years ago, big banks had virtually no stake
in the patent system, while the manufacturing and pharmaceutical
industries have decades of experience in this area.330 Moreover, even
though banks have begun to patent their inventions more, skepticism
remains about the efficacy of patents with respect to financial innovation.331
This skepticism should come as no surprise in light of some
fundamental differences between technological innovation, on the one
hand, and financial innovation, on the other.332 Pharmaceutical innovation
PATENT FAIRNESS, http://www.patentfairness.org/learn/about/ (last visited Oct. 17,
2013); July 17 Letter, supra note 239 at 1 (listing various organizations that wrote to
Congress to urge support for current reform proposals).
327. See Letter to Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, et al. in
support of Patent Reform (Oct. 28, 2013), available at http://www.ccianet.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/Orgs-Letter-to-Congress-on-CBM.pdf
(listing
various
organizations that wrote to Congress to urge support for current reform proposals, e.g.
National Grocers Association, National Restaurant Association, and National Retail
Association); July 17 Letter, supra note 239, at 1 (stating the same).
328. See Dutra, supra note 239 (stating that the “patent troll problem has generally not
affected the pharmaceutical” industry); Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation if Intellectual
Property Rights by Corporations and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 30 (2012)
(stating that there are very low levels of NPE litigation in the pharmaceutical industry).
329. See Letter from the American Bankers Association, the Financial Services
Roundtable, and other bank lobbyists to Rep. Goodlatte dated Oct. 29, 2013, available at
http://www.aba.com/Advocacy/LetterstoCongress/Documents/PatentTrollsHJudJointLetter-102913.pdf (expressing support for the Innovation Act and urging Rep.
Goodlatte to propose further reforms to the patent system); Tracy Kitten, Push for Patent
Reform
Advances
(Nov.
27,
2013),
available
at
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/interviews/patent-reform-legislative-update-i-2121
(discussing the banking industry’s support for the current patent reform measures); Press
Release, Independent Community Bankers of America (Nov. 21, 2013), available at
http://www.icba.org/news/newsreleasedetail.cfm?ItemNumber=175133
(praising
the
Innovation Act and suggesting additional reforms to the patent system).
330. See Schreiner & Axt, supra note 193, at 725-26 (explaining that banks did not
worry about patents before State Street and believed patents were limited to “hard
technology”).
331. Fusco, Patentability of Financial Methods, supra note 27, at 16-23.
332. There is some indication that financial innovation may be heading in a more
technical direction, as compared to more traditional financial innovation, which consists
primarily of business methods and systems. See, e.g., Kortekaas, supra note 275 (discussing
technology-based financial innovations, including Barclay’s smartphone apps to enable
FOR
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is a useful example. Pharmaceutical products are developed over an
extended period of time during which they are tested, challenged, and
replicated before introduction to the market.333
While some
pharmaceuticals are fabulously successful, many fail, so the industry relies
on patents to recoup development costs.334 Financial innovation, by
contrast, occurs very quickly with little experimentation or external
scrutiny.335 Consequently, banks and other financial innovators tend not to
value patents as highly as inventors of more traditional technologies.
In the end, the big banks are nascent players in the patent system
whose experience with and contextualization of this complex landscape are
far too limited to effectively advocate for well-balanced patent policy. Yet,
because of their powerful lobbying force, the banks are poised to exert
disproportionate influence over our patent system in the years to come.
B. The Banks as Patent Owners
Most of the country’s largest banks have increased their patent
holdings in recent years, probably as a defensive response to actual and
threatened infringement suits. Whatever the initial reason for pursuing
patent protection, the end result is that several G-SIFIs now own substantial
patent portfolios. What does this mean for our patent system, specifically,
and our society, more generally? What potential implications should we
consider going forward as our financial industry and patent system become
further intertwined?
1. Litigation Implications
More patents generally translate to more lawsuits,336 so an increase
in litigation surrounding financial business method patents is a distinct
possibility. It might seem ironic that defensive patents—which are
customers to make faster payments).
333. See Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand
Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 423 n.161 (2011) (describing how patent law
affects the decisions of the pharmaceutical industry).
334. See id.
335. See Glaser, supra note 41, at 18 (describing the fast-paced nature of financial
innovation); Charles W. Murdock, The Big Banks: Background, Deregulation, Financial
Innovation, and “Too Big to Fail,” 90 DENV. U. L.REV. 505, 531 (2012) (“To put financial
innovation on the same continuum as technological innovation is disingenuous.”); James F.
Bauerle, Technology, Law & Banking, 125 BANKING L.J. 563, 570 (2008) (explaining that
technological innovations are “tested and certified” and suggesting that financial
innovations should be too).
336. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO
DO ABOUT IT 56 (2004) (explaining that some patent holders use patents as weapons).
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supposed to facilitate “patent peace”—actually increase litigation, but that
is precisely what happened in the high tech sector.337 In the past fifteen or
so years, high tech companies have stockpiled patents to protect themselves
against litigation.338 Over time, companies have come to realize they no
longer need all these unused patents—either because litigation threats from
competitors have dissipated or because defensive patents are ineffective
against PAEs. These unused patents are sold to PAEs “who can make
better use of them,” namely by asserting them against other practicing
companies.339 Bank patents may follow a similar trajectory.
Or perhaps the G-SIFIs will attempt to profit by enforcing their
patents themselves. There are a few different ways the banks might
accomplish this. First, as noted above, the banks could enforce their
patents through licensing campaigns.340 Other companies, including
financial services firms like American Express, have successfully exploited
their once defensive patent portfolios this way.341 Second, banks could
create intellectual property subsidiaries to sue non-competitors for patent
infringement.342 Finally, the banks could start suing each other.343 Before
the Smartphone wars, Apple primarily used its patents for defensive
purposes and was generally viewed as a target of patent litigation.344 But
that all changed when Apple sued Samsung, Motorola, HTC, and others for
patent infringement over its smartphone and tablet technology. 345 Although
337. Chien, From Arms Race, supra note 307, at 308, 337-40 .
338. Id. at 340-41.
339. Id. at 341 (internal quotations omitted).
340. See supra Part V.C (discussing why big banks are patenting their inventions)
341. See Chien, From Arms Race, supra note 307, at 342; The Evolving IP Marketplace:
The Operation of IP Markets: Hearing Before the Fed. Trade Comm’n 38 (Apr. 17, 2009)
(statement of Tracey R. Thomas, Chief IP Strategist and License Negotiator, American
Express Co.) (explaining that some companies including American Express have found it
profitable to enforce their patent portfolios).
342. See Chien, From Arms Race, supra note 307, at 342; Jay P. Kesan, David L.
Schwartz & Ted Sichelman, Paving the Path to Accurately Predicting Legal Outcomes: A
Comment on Professor Chien’s Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 97, 104 (2012)
(“[A] large manufacturing company may be the parent of an IP holding company. Yet,
executives at the parent company often decide whether to litigate and, effectively, control all
aspects of the litigation.”).
343. But see Fusco, Patentability of Financial Methods, supra note 27, at 18-20, 27
(concluding that, for many financial institutions, it is more advantageous to be able to copy
competitors’ products than to have the exclusive rights over one’s own products).
344. Chien, From Arms Race, supra note 307, at 322.
345. See, e.g., Smartphone Cases Caught Up in Patent Wars, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Jan. 31,
2013),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-01-31/business/chi-smartphone-casesnowcaught-up-in-patent-wars-20130131_1_patent-wars-lifeproof-smartphones (last visited
Nov. 9, 2013); Glenn G. Lammi, ‘Tis the Season for More Smartphone ‘Patent War’ Court
Rulings, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2012/12/19/tis-theseason-for-more-smartphone-patent-war-courtrulings/; Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The
Patent,
Used
as
a
Sword,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
8,
2012),
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the litigation is ongoing, Apple has enjoyed some great successes so far,
including a $1.05 billion jury verdict in 2012 in its suit against Samsung.346
Although the judge reduced the verdict by $405 million, on retrial the jury
awarded $290 million, so Apple still recovered more than $900 million in
damages.347
Litigation can certainly be profitable for patent owners, yet there
are serious costs as well. Patent litigation has always been risky and
unpredictable, but that may be even truer going forward as patents are
subjected to post-grant review, discovery in patent cases is severely
limited, and district courts exercise wider latitude with respect to attorney’s
fees.348 Moreover, patent litigation detracts firms from their core business,
diverts resources, jeopardizes important business relationships with
competitors, and potentially impedes long-term growth.349 This is
especially problematic for small companies for whom patent litigation is
often cost prohibitive.350 In short, excessive patenting and litigation can
deter small firms from entry into a market, thereby stifling competition to
the detriment of consumers.351
The costs of patent litigation are further complicated in the context
of the business of banking. As discussed in Part V.B., the activities of
financial holding companies (which include all the G-SIFIs) are limited to

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-giants-canstiflecompetition.html (discussing Apple’s litigious nature in regards to protecting its products
through patent suits).
346. Nick Wingfield, Jury Awards $1 Billion to Apple in Samsung Patent Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 24, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/technology/juryreaches-decision-in-applesamsung-patent-trial.html?_r=0.
347. Gerry Shih, U.S. Jury Awards Apple $290 Million in Retrial Against Samsung,
REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2013, 6:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/21/us-applesamsung-verdict-idUSBRE9AK19V20131121.
348. See supra Part IV.C (discussing new proposals for patent reform).
349. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, 5-6 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (explaining that questionable patents may
deter innovation or raise its costs); Judge James Scott Sledge, Mediating Copyright and
Intellectual Property Disputes, Sept./Oct. 2013, LANDSLIDE at 48, 49, available at
http://www.mccammongroup.com/articles/LAND_MAG_V6N1_SepOct_Sledge.pdf
(“Business relationships are a casualty of litigation.”).
350. See, e.g., Gwendolyn G. Ball & Jay P. Kesan, Transaction Costs and Trolls:
Strategic Behavior by Individual Inventors, Small Firms and Entrepreneurs in Patent
Litigation 5-6 (Univ. of Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 0821, Univ. of Ill. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. LE09-005 (2009)
(explaining that small firms have fewer resources to pursue patent litigation), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1337166.
351. See, e.g., James Bessen, Adoption Costs and the Rate of Return to R&D 4-6 (2002)
(introducing a formula which estimates adoption costs), available at
http://www.researchoninnovation.org/rdadopt.pdf.
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those that are “financial in nature.”352 The full explanation for such
limitation is complex and beyond the scope of this Article. However, one
of the less discussed justifications for limiting the activities of banks is to
ensure that banks provide an impartial and efficient source of credit without
the prospect of distraction from that task by unrelated or conflicting
activities.353 From this view, banks are seen as something like a public
utility in that they provide a necessary public service and in return receive
government support through, among other programs, deposit insurance.354
One might conclude that banks’ involvement in patent litigation—
especially in cases in which the patented invention is unrelated to their core
operations—is an undesirable distraction from the business of banking. On
the other hand, if patent litigation by big banks centers on innovations that
are important to the banking business, then big banks (who already
maintain a competitive advantage by being deemed “too big to fail”) may
gain even greater competitive advantage over smaller institutions that can
afford neither the costs of litigation, nor the costs of licensing patented
processes.
2. Regulatory Implications
To the extent that big banks are highly regulated entities, we also
consider the possibility of regulatory implications associated with this
increase in the big banks’ patent activities. A search through the patents
owned by large financial institutions turns up all of the high profile culprits
of the recent Financial Crisis, e.g., securitizations, hedge funds, VaR, etc.
We wonder whether increased reliance on the patent process for such
innovations has benefits beyond those associated with the patent system.
Perhaps the enhanced transparency associated with the patent process is
valuable. The filing of a patent application requires the inventor to fully
describe the invention.355
The disclosure requirement provides
transparency that is obviously missing when inventors rely on trade secrets
to prevent appropriability. While bank regulators and the new Office of
Financial Research356 have the ability to probe financial institutions for
352. See supra note 202.
353. See Omarova, supra note 301, at 10 (“The need to ensure an impartial and efficient
allocation of credit throughout the national economy provides another compelling
justification for disallowing the mixing of banking and commerce.”).
354. Former Kansas City Federal Reserve President Thomas Hoenig attracted attention
when he labeled banks public utilities in the wake of the bailouts of the Financial Crisis.
See Joe Rauch, Big Banks are Government Backed: Fed’s Hoenig, REUTERS, (Apr. 12,
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/12/us-fed-hoenigidUSTRE73B3S820110412. Hoenig is currently Vice Chairman of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
355. See supra Part II.B. (discussing the patentability of financial innovations).
356. The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
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detailed information regarding their financial products even when such
information is not available to the public, patents may still be useful to
regulators because they “push information exchange from an informal basis
to a more formal one.”357
To highlight this point, consider what happens if a bank forgoes
patent protection and relies on trade secrecy instead. Trade secrets, unlike
patents, can last forever.358 So unless the trade secret is reverse engineered
or disclosed some other way by a third party, the bank could protect its
invention indefinitely. But even if a bank chooses to disseminate
information regarding the innovation either directly (e.g., through press
releases) or indirectly (e.g., through interactions with regulators, customers,
or even competitors), the quality of that information may be low. With a
patent, on the other hand, formal disclosure is required in the patent
application so the invention can be practiced by someone having ordinary
skill in the art.359 The patent process may serve as an additional source of
information to regulators interested in bank activities—especially those that
the banks deem worthy of significant investment. We also recognize the
possibility that the information generated in the patent process might not be
useful to regulators—either because it is irrelevant to regulatory goals or
too stale to illuminate current practices.
It may also be true that the patenting of certain innovations could
be detrimental to effective bank regulation. Consider, for example, the fact
that big banks have shown interest in patenting risk management
processes.360 As discussed in Part I, risk management has become an
essential tool of bank regulation. If any of these risk management
innovations proves particularly effective, regulators may want to adopt
such processes as part of best, or even required, practices for all banks,
large and small. If the process is patented and cannot be designed around,
then the owners of such patents may balk at the suggestion of use by their
competitors (or, at least, they will want to charge for it). After all, the
whole point of the innovation is that it gives a competitive advantage.
Therefore, allowing for the patenting of such processes may prevent efforts
to improve overall financial stability. Admittedly this is conjecture, but

established the Office of Financial Research (OFR) in recognition of the lack of financial
data and sophisticated analysis of the financial system prior to the Financial Crisis. The
OFR supports the Financial Stability Oversight Council by providing information and
analytical tools regarding future systemic threats. 12 U.S.C. § 5343 (2006).
357. Merges, supra note 40, at 23.
358. Merges, Mennell & Lemley, supra note 42, at 27.
359. See, e.g., ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940-41 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (holding the patent in question invalid for lack of enablement).
360. See supra notes 287-289 and accompanying text (listing various patents held by
financial institutions).
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similar problems have arisen with standards essential patents in the high
tech industry.361
CONCLUSION
The story of big banks and their business method patents may be in
its first chapter. This Article highlights some of the potential tensions
created by the intersection of the financial industry and the patent system—
two vitally important institutions to our nation’s prosperity. Big banks’
experience with our patent system is short-lived and their motivations for
seeking patents are likely multifaceted. If big banks continue to seek patent
protection, engage in patent litigation, and lobby Congress for reform, the
impact on the U.S. patent system could be significant. Big banks have the
political and economic power to impose change that spills well beyond the
boundaries of financial innovation and the financial industry. While it is
too soon to tell what this merging of landscapes will mean for our financial
system, innovation policy, or society more generally, we suggest that
policymakers and stakeholders keep a close eye as this relationship
continues to evolve.

361. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002) (discussing the role of standard-setting
organizations in the patent industry).
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APPENDIX

CASE
NUMBER
CBM201400077
CBM201400076
CBM201400075
CBM201400074
CBM201400073
CBM201400072
CBM201400071
CBM201400070
CBM201400069
CBM201400068
CBM201400064

DATE
FILED
2/21/14

PATENT

PETITIONER

7424438

2/19/14

8311945

Monster
Worldwide, Inc.
US Bancorp

2/18/14

7827119

GTNX, Inc.

2/18/14

7752142

GTNX, Inc.

CBM201400063

1/28/14

8489420

Experian
Marketing
Solutions
CoreSource, Inc.

CBM201400062

1/28/14

8036916

CoreSource, Inc.

CBM201400061
CBM201400060

1/28/14

7117165

1/23/14

6857022

Coupa Software,
Inc.
MotionPoint
Corp.

CBM201400059

1/8/14

7899704

2/19/14
2/18/14
2/18/14

7761387
7756794

6963826

GTNX, Inc.
GTNX, Inc.
ComScore, Inc.

2/12/14

8374901

2/12/14

8374901

Monster
Worldwide, Inc.
Indeed, Inc.

2/12/14

7424438

Indeed, Inc.

1/29/14

8161104

PATENT
OWNER

Cardlytics, Inc.

RPOST
Int’l
Quality
Healthcare
Intermed.,
Quality
Healthcare
Intermed.,
Ariba, Inc.
Trans
Perfect
Global, Inc.
Tuition
Fund LLC
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CBM201400058
CBM201400057

1/8/14

7653572

Cardlytics, Inc.

1/7/14

5910988

Jack Henry
Assocs. Inc.

&

CBM201400056

1/7/14

6032137

Jack Henry
Assocs. Inc.

&

CBM201400054
CBM201400053
CBM201400052
CBM201400051

12/23/13

7035914

Google, Inc.

12/20/13

8468099

Hulu LLC

12/20/13

8479246

Hulu LLC

12/20/13

8165939

Stewart
Title
Guaranty Co.

CBM201400050
CBM201400049
CBM201400048
CBM201400047

12/19/13

8239451

12/19/13

6237916

American Express
Co.
GTECH Corp.

12/19/13

6698759

GTECH Corp.

12/18/13

8266000

Ebay Inc.

CBM201400044
CBM201400043
CBM201400042
CBM201400041

12/15/13

7899704

12/15/13

7653572

12/15/13

7499872

11/22/13

6237095

Edo Interactive,
Inc.
Edo Interactive,
Inc.
Edo Interactive,
Inc.
PNC Bank, N.A.

CBM201400040

11/22/13

6105013

PNC Bank, N.A.

CBM201400039

11/22/13

5949880

PNC Bank, N.A.

Tuition
Fund LLC
Data
Treasury
Corp.
Data
Treasury
Corp.
SimpleAir,
Inc.
Intertainer,
Inc.
Intertainer,
Inc.
Segin
Software
LLC
Metasearch
Sys. LLC
SHFL
Enter. Inc.
SHFL
Enter. Inc.
Advanced
Auctions
LLC
Tuition
Fund LLC
Tuition
Fund LLC
Tuition
Fund LLC
Maxim
Integrated
Products
Maxim
Integrated
Products
Maxim
Integrated
Products
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CBM201400038

11/22/13

5940510

PNC Bank, N.A.

CBM201400037

11/16/13

7693783

SecureBuy, LLC

CBM201400036

11/15/13

8140429

SecureBuy, LLC

CBM201400035

11/15/13

7051002

SecureBuy, LLC

CBM201400034
CBM201400033

11/13/13

7596784

11/12/13

7260587

Rackspace
Hosting, Inc.
Bank of America,
Nat’l Ass’n

CBM201400032

11/12/13

7757298

CBM201400031

11/12/13

6182894

CBM201400030

11/12/13

7603382

CBM201400029

11/12/13

7664701

CBM201400028

11/12/13

8083137

CBM201400027
CBM201400026

11/9/13

5361201

REDFIN Corp.

11/4/13

5576951

eBay Inc.

CBM201400025

11/4/13

7010508

GSI Commerce
Solutions, Inc.

CBM201400024
CBM2014-

11/1/13

8402281

10/25/13

5910988

Voltage Security,
Inc.
Fidelity
Nat’l

PNC Fin. Servs.
Group, Inc. &
PNC Bank
PNC Fin. Servs.
Group, Inc. &
PNC Bank
Bank of America,
Nat’l Ass’n
PNC Fin. Servs.
Group, Inc. &
PNC Bank
Bank of America,
Nat’l Ass’n

[Vol. 16:2

Maxim
Integrated
Products
Cardinal
Commerce
Corp.
Cardinal
Commerce
Corp.
Cardinal
Commerce
Corp.
Clouding
IP LLC
Intellectual
Ventures II
LLC
Intellectual
Ventures I
LLC
Intellectual
Ventures II
LLC
Intellectual
Ventures I
LLC
Intellectual
Ventures I
LLC
Intellectual
Ventures I
LLC
Corelogic
Solutions
Landmark
Techs.,
LLC
Landmark
Techs.,
LLC
Protegrity
Corp.
Data
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Info. Servs., Inc.

CBM201400020

10/25/13

6032137

Fidelity
Nat’l
Info. Servs., Inc.

CBM201400019
CBM201400018
CBM201400017

10/22/13

7490091

10/21/13

8037158

American Express
Co.
SAP America

10/16/13

8209389

Epsilon
Data
Mgmt. LLC

CBM201400016
CBM201400015
CBM201400014
CBM201400013
CBM201400012

10/15/13

6871325

Agilysys, Inc.

10/15/13

6384850

Agilysys, Inc.

10/15/13

8146077

Agilysys, Inc.

10/15/13

6982733

Apple, Inc.

10/16/13

6625582

Regions
Corp.

CBM201400010

10/11/13

8224913

CBM201400008

10/11/13

6950807

Experian
Marketing
Solutions, Inc.
Westlake
Fin.
Servs.

CBM201400007

10/11/13

5412730

Callidus Software
Inc.

CBM201400006
CBM201400005
CBM201400004

10/9/13

7203752

Google Inc.

10/8/13

7024205

Google Inc.

10/8/13

7463151

Google Inc.

Fin.

491
Treasury
Corp.
Data
Treasury
Corp.
Metasearch
Sys. LLC
Pi-Net Int’l
RPOST
Communic
ations Ltd.
Ameranth,
Inc.
Ameranth,
Inc.
Ameranth,
Inc.
Ameranth,
Inc.
Retirement
Capital
Access
Mgmt. Co.
RPOST
Communic
ations Ltd.
Credit
Acceptance
Corp.
TQB
Developme
nt LLC
Unwired
Planet LLC
Unwired
Planet LLC
Unwired
Planet LLC
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CBM201400003

10/4/13

5884272

Google Inc.

CBM201400002

10/4/13

5884270

Google Inc.

CBM201400001
CBM201300059

10/1/13

8326924

9/16/13

5949880

American Express
Co.
Branch Banking
& Trust Co.

CBM201300058
CBM201300057
CBM201300056
CBM201300055

9/17/13

7840486

9/17/13

8036988

9/11/13

7970674

9/4/13

8266015

GSI Commerce
Solutions, Inc.

CBM201300054

8/30/13

7908304

Callidus Software,
Inc.

CBM201300053

8/29/13

7958024

Callidus Software,
Inc.

CBM201300052

8/28/13

7904326

Callidus Software,
Inc.

CBM201300051

9/6/13

8266044

Int’l
Securities
Exch., LLC

CBM201300050

9/6/13

7980457

Int’l Secs. Exch.,
LLC

CBM201300049

9/6/13

7356498

Int’l Secs. Exch.,
LLC

CBM2013-

8/21/13

5664110

eBay, Inc.

MasterCard
Inc.
MasterCard
Inc.
Trulia, Inc.

Int’l
Int’l
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Inventor
Holdings
LLC
Inventor
Holdings
LLC
Metasearch
Sys. LLC
Maxim
Integrated
Products,
Inc.
John
D’Agostino
John
D’Agostino
Zillow, Inc.
Clear With
Computers,
LLC
Versata
Dev. Grp.,
Inc.
Versata
Dev. Grp.,
Inc.
Versata
Dev. Grp.,
Inc.
Chicago
Board
Options
Exch., Inc.
Chicago
Board
Options
Exch., Inc.
Chicago
Board
Options
Exch., Inc.
Cronos

2014]

BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS

00048
CBM201300047
CBM201300046

8/19/13

David W. Gillman

8/16/13

RE04390
4
8438055

CBM201300044

8/16/13

8452646

Groupon, Inc.

CBM201300042

8/16/13

5878400

SAP
Inc.

CBM201300040

8/2/13

5424944

Dell, Inc.

CBM201300038

7/29/13

8185408

Search
Inc.

America,

CBM201300037

7/29/13

7333937

Search
Inc.

America,

CBM201300036

7/16/13

7441196

Google, Inc.

CBM201300035

6/25/13

7664516

Groupon, Inc.

CBM201300034

6/25/13

8457670

Groupon, Inc.

CBM201300033

6/25/13

8155679

Groupon, Inc.

CBM201300032
CBM201300031

6/25/13

7792749

6/24/13

7996311

Fidelity Nat’l Info
Servs., Inc.
Fidelity Nat’l Info
Servs., Inc.

Groupon, Inc.

America,

493
Techs.
LLC
StoneEagle
Servs., Inc.
Blue
Calypso,
LLC
Blue
Calypso,
LLC
Versata
Software,
Inc.
Disposition
Servs.,
LLC
TransUnio
n
Intelligence
, LLC
TransUnio
n
Intelligence
, LLC
EMG
Technolog
y, LLC
Blue
Calypso,
Inc.
Blue
Calypso,
LLC
Blue
Calypso,
LLC
CheckFree
Corp.
CheckFree
Corp.
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CBM201300030
CBM201300028
CBM201300027
CBM201300026
CBM201300025
CBM201300024
CBM201300021
CBM201300019
CBM201300018

6/24/13

7853524

6/24/13

7383223

6/18/13

6418419

5/31/13

7298271

Fidelity Nat’l Info
Servs., Inc.
Fidelity Nat’l Info
Servs., Inc.
Chicago
Merc.
Exch., Inc.
Google, Inc.

5/29/13

7856430

LinkedIn Corp.

5/24/13

8095413

5/6/13

5966440

salesforce.com,
Inc.
Apple Inc.

5/6/13

5191573

Apple Inc.

4/23/13

7426481

Volusion, Inc.

CBM201300017

4/23/13

6834282

Volusion, Inc.

CBM201300016
CBM201300015

4/23/13

8346637

4/2/13

5862223

Harland
Clarke
Holdings Corp.
Oracle Corp.

CBM201300014

3/29/13

6625582

US Bancorp

CBM201300013
CBM201300009
CBM201300008

3/22/13

8037158

11/20/12

8140358

11/14/12

6438526

SAP
America,
Inc.
Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co.
MeridianLink,
Inc.

CBM201300005

10/15/12

7941357

Bloomberg Inc.
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CheckFree
Corp.
CashEdge,
Inc.
5th Market,
Inc.
Peter
Sprogis
AvMarkets
Inc.
VirtualAgil
ity, Inc.
SightSound
Tech., LLC
SightSound
Tech., LLC
Versata
Dev. Grp.,
Inc.
Versata
Dev. Grp.,
Inc.
EZShield,
Inc.
Communit
y
United
IP, LLC
Retirement
Capital
Access
Manageme
nt, LLC
Pi-Net Int’l
Inc.
Progressive
Cas. Ins.
DH
Holdings
LLC
Markets
Alert Pty
Ltd.

2014]

BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS

CBM201300003

10/15/12

8090598

Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co.

CBM201300001

10/3/12

7877269

Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co.

CBM201200010

9/29/12

7124088

Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co.

CBM201200007

9/19/12

5361201

Interthinx, Inc.

CBM201200005
CBM201200003

9/21/12

6675151

9/16/12

8140358

CRS
Advanced
Tech., Inc.
Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co.

CBM201200002

9/16/12

6064970

Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co.

CBM201200001

9/16/12

6553350

SAP
Inc.

America,

495
Progressive
Cas.
Ins.
Co.
Progressive
Cas.
Ins.
Co.
Progressive
Cas.
Ins.
Co.
CoreLogic
Solutions,
LLC
Frontlines
Techs., Inc.
Progressive
Cas.
Ins.
Co.
Progressive
Cas.
Ins.
Co.
Versata
Software,
Inc.

